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ARTICLES
Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions
Abraham Bell† & Gideon Parchomovsky††
INTRODUCTION
Every property problem spans three distinct dimensions: number
of owners, scope of each owner’s dominion, and asset design. These
three basic dimensions can be traced back to Blackstone’s famous
encapsulation of property law as the “sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the uni1
verse.” Blackstone described the optimal dominion as absolute (“sole
and despotic dominion”), the ideal number of owners as one (“a single man”), and the subject matter of property rights to be very broad
2
(“over the external things of the world”).
Blackstone’s description has proved a durable—albeit inaccu3
rate—reference point for property theorists, who have directed their
attention to each of the three dimensions identified by Blackstone—
dominion, ownership, and asset—in descending order of importance.
As any first-year student knows, modern theorists have savaged
4
the idea of “absolute dominion” and tend, instead, to view property as
5
6
a “bundle of rights,” with no single, fixed “ownership right.” Rather,
† Visiting Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Lecturer, Bar Ilan University,
Faculty of Law.
†† Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor, Bar Ilan University,
Faculty of Law. This Article greatly benefited from comments and criticisms by Ben Depoorter,
Lee Anne Fennell, Mark Fenster, Sonia Katyal, Jim Krier, Tom Merrill, Adam Mossoff, Dan Richman,
Ed Rock, Carol Rose, Chris Serkin, Peter Siegelman, Henry Smith, Phil Weiser, and participants in
the 2007 Property Works in Progress Conference at the University of Colorado Law School.
1
William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England *2 (Chicago 1979).
2
See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L J 1315, 1362–63 (1993) (enumerating the Blackstonian package of private entitlements).
3
See, for example, id (relating the evolution of standard land interests to the Blackstonian ideal).
4
See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 Yale L J 601, 612
(1998) (referring to the “exclusive dominion” view of property as “artificial”); Bruce A. Ackerman,
Private Property and the Constitution 26 (Yale 1977) (“[First-year property students] learn that only
the ignorant think it meaningful to talk about owning things free and clear of further obligation.”).
5
See generally James E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L
Rev 711 (1996). See also Ackerman, Private Property at 26 (cited in note 4) (explaining that
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each right, power, privilege, or duty is but one stick in the total bun7
dle. The ideal of property as driving toward a single owner fared much
better and continues to enjoy a pride of place in contemporary property
8
theory. “Things,” the third predicate of the Blackstonian edifice, has
received the least attention. Primarily, modern scholars have challenged
the idealized concept along two axes. First, they have questioned the
exclusive focus on tangible goods as the subject matter of property,
pointing out that intangible assets, such as intellectual works, may also
9
be subject to private property rights. Second, in Anglo-American law,
even when tangible objects are concerned, property rights attach to
reified estates rather than the thing itself. Thus, properly understood, an
owner does not own land but rather a fee simple absolute (or some
10
other estate) in land. Yet, property theory is still searching for an accu11
rate means of conveying the “‘thingness’ of private property.”
In this Article, we argue that the idealized Blackstonian characterization led many subsequent scholars astray: although Blackstone
property law “considers the way rights to use things may be parceled out amongst a host of
competing resource users”).
6
A.M. Honore famously produced a list of no less than eleven “leading incidents” of
property ownership. A.M. Honore, Ownership, in A.G. Guest, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence
107, 113 (Oxford 1961).
7
See generally, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77
Neb L Rev 730 (1998) (arguing that while property owners enjoy a varied package of legal rights,
the right to exclude is both necessary and sufficient for identifying the existence of property).
8
Without specific reference to Blackstone, Harold Demsetz’s classic Toward a Theory of
Property Rights posited that the law creates property rights over an object in order to allow a
single owner to internalize the various externalities associated with that object. See generally
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347 (1967). Demsetz’s
insight about the centrality of a single owner as a means for internalizing externalities was further developed by scholars such as Richard Epstein, Michael Heller, and Francesco Parisi. See
Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald
Coase, 36 J L & Econ 553, 562–63 (1993) (stating that concentrating all the incidents of ownership in a single person minimizes the transaction costs of reallocating property to its best use);
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-commons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv L Rev 621, 631 (1998) (arguing that in regimes transitioning from socialism to
private markets, the resources that emerge as private property most successfully are those that
begin the transition with a near-standard bundle of rights assigned to a single person); Francesco
Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 Am J Comp L 595, 613–17 (2002) (discussing legal mechanisms
that promote reunification of fragmented property in a single owner).
9
See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 Harv J
L & Pub Policy 108, 118 (1990) (arguing that, except in the rarest case, the law should treat intellectual and tangible property identically). But see Mark R. Patterson, When Is Property Intellectual? The Leveraging Problem, 73 S Cal L Rev 1133, 1138–39 (2000) (discussing special antitrust
difficulties presented by intellectual property).
10 See Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in John Brewer and Susan Staves, eds,
Early Modern Conceptions of Property 95, 100 (Routledge 1995) (critically discussing the historic
process of reification by which estates became independent assets subject to ownership).
11 Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 Yale L J 1163, 1193 (1998)
(identifying the bundle-of-legal-relations metaphor as a weak portrayal of the “thingness” of
private property).
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correctly identified the building blocks of property law, property law
12
does not and cannot achieve the Blackstonian ideal. The key to this
paradox is to be found in the fact that property law cannot be explained by scholarly investigations that isolate one of the three Black13
stonian factors from the others.
Property puzzles can rarely be understood using one-dimensional
analysis. The ideals of a single owner, full dominion, and optimal assets
often conflict among themselves. Thus, property law must on many
occasions compromise its pursuit of one of the ideals for the other.
Rules that drive toward creating the ideal number of owners must
interact with rules seeking to create or preserve the ideal asset size
together with the ideal package of legal powers and rights. Overlooking one of the dimensions leads to an incomplete, and often distorted,
view of the field. Unfortunately, there has been no systematic threedimensional analysis of property rules.
The goal of this Article is to develop a comprehensive understanding of property law by conceptualizing it as a three-dimensional
balancing act. Viewing property in this light yields several important
contributions to the burgeoning literature on property theory.
First, a three-dimensional conceptualization offers a far more varied picture than is commonly acknowledged. As needs change along
one or more of the axes—owner, dominion, or asset—the overall concept of the property right must be adjusted accordingly in order to
maintain maximum benefit from property rights. Consequently, when
the law pushes for the Blackstonian ideal of absolute dominion of a
single owner over things, it inexorably finds itself drawn into a more
compromised stance. Property law, therefore, is a balancing act: as property rights fall out of sync on one dimension, the law must adjust its protections on other dimensions in order to maximize property rights. We
demonstrate the importance of this general theoretical insight by illustrating how a three-dimensional perspective challenges conventional
understanding of such property issues as appropriation rules, commons
property, fragmentation of rights, nuisance, and land assembly.

12 It is important to note that Blackstone himself acknowledged the complexity of property notwithstanding the idealized conception. In this sense, what is referred to as the Blackstonian conception of property is a misnomer. Consider Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1362–63 & n 237
(cited in note 2) (summarizing what has subsequently become known as the “Blackstonian Bundle of Rights” but immediately admitting that this characterization “is most uncharitable to
Blackstone,” who recognized many of the complexities and nuances of property law).
13 An important precursor to our Article is Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-dimensional Framework
for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 UC Davis L Rev 813 (2003), which examined two of
the three dimensions: owner and dominion.
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Second, the perspective we develop in this Article illuminates six
strategies property law employs to diffuse the tension among its constitutive dimensions. These six strategies are as follows:
Fictional owners. In order to maintain some of the advantages of
having a single owner even though there are multiple individuals who
actually own rights, the law often concentrates ownership in assets in a
single fictional owner. The most outstanding example of this is corporate-owned property. Other instances include partnerships, decedents’
estates, and married couples.
Fictional assets. A second strategy is the creation of fictional assets, so as to slice up a “thing” into pieces small enough to be amenable to full dominion by a single owner. This strategy lies behind the
reification of property rights and explains why the law insists upon
ownership of estates (such as fees simple) rather than land or chattels.
The use of this fiction enables a single owner of a future interest and a
single owner of a present interest to each enjoy relatively uncompromised dominion (subject only to the rules of waste) over full and separate—albeit fictional—assets.
Forced reconfiguration. This strategy primarily involves rules forcing owners to relinquish fractional property interests to a single owner.
Examples include partition by sale, the (infamous) Rule against Perpetuities, disentailing, and, most importantly, takings by eminent domain
for purposes of land assembly. In cases of land assembly, takings allow
the government to simultaneously change the number of owners (typi14
cally to one) and the asset size (typically to a larger asset).
Limits on owner-initiated reconfiguration or size. In order to preserve ideal asset size or configuration, the law often confines the ability of an owner to change the size of her real estate parcel without the
state’s permission. For example, zoning regulations limit the ability of
a lot owner to divide it physically into smaller lots without permission
15
to parcelize from local authorities.
14 Takings may also be employed to force an owner of an interest in a large asset to divide
the asset to permit the creation of single owners over each of the smaller assets. Such was the
case in Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229 (1984), where legislation forced owners
to sell fee simple interests, through intermediaries, to their tenants in order to combat the problem of excessively concentrated land ownership in Hawaii. See id at 232–34.
15 See Kenneth H. Young, 4 Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 25.03 at 284–89 (Clark
Boardman Callaghan 4th ed 1997) (discussing the objectives of subdivision controls). Sometimes
the restriction is imposed on metaphysical, rather than physical, alterations, as evidenced by the
numerus clausus principle that prevents individuals from creating new property rights. A variant
on this strategy, which we may label “forced presentism,” curbs or eliminates the owner’s power
to interfere with future owners’ dominion over an asset. Thus, the law prevents unreasonable
restraints on alienation and discharges servitudes in light of changed circumstances. Some applications of the doctrine of waste also employ forced presentism. These rules preserve as close to
full dominion as possible over time.
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Transfer or elimination of elements of dominion. The goal of this
strategy is to restrict the dominion of the owner in possession by either
transferring certain rights or privileges to others or by eliminating them
altogether. It enables lawmakers to hold asset size or configuration constant, while compromising the owner’s dominion. The traditional example
is the doctrine of waste, which restricted the tenant in possession from
16
using the property to the detriment of other co-owners. Modern examples of this strategy include conservation easements, which transfer to a
third party control over certain environmental amenities on private land
without depriving the owner of her fee simple, and use restrictions in zoning laws, which eliminate certain use privileges from the owner’s domain.
Differential acquisition rules. A final strategy polices the degree
and timing of privatization of assets. Thus, some resources are subject
to a rule of capture, encouraging rapid assimilation into the domain of
private property; others are subject to rules such as reasonable use or
public trust that prevent full transition to private property. This strategy enables policymakers to keep certain assets’ characteristics subject to other nonprivate property regimes.
We show that the entire law of property can be organized around
these six reconciliatory strategies. Hence, we offer a clear and coherent way of understanding property law in its entirety.
Our final contribution is normative. We draw on these strategies
to craft new solutions to longstanding property puzzles. For example,
consider some of the examples of excessive “fragmentation” of prop17
18
erty discussed by Michael Heller and Francesco Parisi. These include such situations as traditional Native American tribal lands. In
order to keep ownership of land within the tribe, federal law imposed
restrictions on the alienability of tribal members-owners’ property
interests. After a few generations, tribal land holdings were characterized by a plethora of owners with extremely small and undivided
19
shares, which led to underuse and abandonment. Both Heller and
Parisi pointed out excessive fragmentation of property interests leads

16 Other legal mechanisms employed to this end include trusts, some kinds of servitudes,
and many kinds of zoning or environmental laws. We include trusts in this category even though
we acknowledge that, in some respects, trusts also fall under the category of fictional owners, as
well as having characteristics of fictional assets.
17 See Heller, 111 Harv L Rev at 679–87 (cited in note 8) (introducing and discussing “the
tragedy of the anticommons,” which results in the underuse of resources).
18 See Parisi, 50 Am J Comp L at 599–600, 626–27 (cited in note 8).
19 Hodel v Irving, 481 US 704, 707–08 (1987) (discussing the process by which “40-, 80-, and
160-acre parcels became splintered into multiple undivided interests in land, with some parcels
having hundreds, and many parcels having dozens, of owners”).
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20

to too many undivided interests in an asset. Focusing their attention
on that dimension alone, each of them argued that the solution should
focus on limiting fragmentation or forcing aggregation.
Once one views the problem, as we do, as spanning three dimensions, innovative solutions come to light. For instance, rather than attempt to aggregate the asset held by multiple owners, one may utilize
a strategy of creating a fictional owner, such as a tribal cooperative,
with tribal member-owners exchanging their undivided fractional interests in the land for shares in the cooperative. Alternatively, one
might create a tribal trust to manage the land with tribal members
retaining undivided fractional beneficial interests. Finally, policymakers might consider making the land freely alienable and formalizing
21
limited nonpossessory tribal rights to protect traditional land uses.
Likewise, consider the example of eminent domain. Eminent domain is frequently analyzed in the context of land assembly; indeed,
some scholars view land assembly as the quintessential and perhaps
22
only legitimate justification for the eminent domain power. Eminent
domain is justified in the case of land assembly as the necessary solution for strategic holdouts that may prevent the state from aggregating
a number of smaller parcels in order to provide a public good with the
new, assembled parcel. A three-dimensional analysis recognizes that the
problem may be viewed in several ways: too many owners, too small
assets, or too much dominion (power to hold out). Holdout problems
may be resolved, therefore, along all three dimensions. As we explain in
detail in Part IV, instead of using eminent domain to aggregate the assets, the state can aggregate the owners, as it does in forced pooling ar23
rangements in oil and gas law. Or, it may change the acquisition rules
24
to permit would-be assemblers to force sales for certain uses.
Structurally, the Article unfolds in four Parts. Part I introduces a
theoretical framework for understanding the interplay of the three
dimensions of property. In particular, we show that both private actors
in the marketplace and policymakers defining property rights must
aim at maximizing property value as a function of three variables. Part
II of the Article reviews current scholarship of property with an eye
toward teasing out doctrines where analysis has been led astray by
20 See Heller, 111 Harv L Rev at 685–87 (cited in note 8); Parisi, 50 Am J Comp L at 599–600,
626–27 (cited in note 8).
21 See Part IV.A.
22 See, for example, Michael Heller and Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 Harv L
Rev 1465, 1467 (2008).
23 See Part IV.D.
24 See Abraham Bell, Private Takings 33–37 (unpublished manuscript, 2007) (discussing
government-mediated private takings in which the government uses its eminent domain power
to allow private actors to seize property).
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failing to take account of all three dimensions of property. In each
case, we examine the interplay of the three dimensions of property
and show why property doctrines must take account of all three dimensions at once. Part III elaborates the strategies actually employed
by the law to deal with the uneasily reconciled needs of value maximization along three dimensions and maps these strategies onto current
doctrine. Part IV presents normative suggestions, demonstrating that
many of the three-dimensional strategies of property policymakers
may be used in new contexts.
I. ORDERING PROPERTY IN THREE DIMENSIONS
Property is always a three-dimensional puzzle, comprising owners, assets, and dominion. Property is three-dimensional not only in the
private realm, where people have to consider how to allocate their
rights over assets, but also in the public realm where government must
create and police legal property forms to meet private needs.
To illustrate, consider one of the most basic problems of property
law: what to do when owners of property in common decide to part ways.
The law formally recognizes two basic options. One is to preserve the
owners’ identities and divide the asset among the different owners. The
other is to maintain the asset’s unity and change the identity of the owner(s) by selling the asset and dividing the proceeds. The law labels these
25
two options “partition in kind” and “partition by sale” respectively. In
truth, however, the choice standing before a judge is not binary.
In addition to the two recognized options, courts have the possibility of holding both asset unity and owner identity constant, while
adjusting the rights (or dominion) of the owners. While the law has no
formal label for this option, courts have already made decisions of this
type. This, for example, was the course chosen by the Surrogate’s Court
26
in In re McDowell, where the disputants were siblings arguing about
27
the ownership of their deceased father’s old rocking chair. The court
ruled that, as heirs, the siblings each owned a share in the chair and that
28
the two would have to trade off possession of the chair every six months.
In other words, the court rejected the traditional owner-oriented and asset-oriented resolutions of partition problems and instead invented one
oriented toward dominion through forced time-sharing.

25 See Richard R. Powell, 7 Powell on Real Property § 50.07[4]–[5] at 50-47 to 50-51 (Matthew Bender 2007) (Michael Allan Wolf, ed).
26 345 NYS2d 828 (Sur Ct 1973).
27 See id at 829.
28 See id at 830 (failing to address the issue as one of partition but rather describing it as
one of resolving ownership).
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We argue that it is not surprising that, in resolving partition disputes, courts may act along one or more of three axes: owner, asset, or
dominion. Three-dimensionality is the defining characteristic of property rights. As such, any definition or adjustment of property rights
necessarily involves a puzzle of maximizing value as a function of
three variables.
In this Part, we demonstrate and justify the ubiquity of threedimensional concerns in the law of property. We claim that the importance of the three concerns and the tensions among them stem from
the very nature of property. We discuss this claim from two divergent
vantage points: private ordering and public ordering of property regimes. We show that both the private and public order continuously
shuffle property rights and forms to maximize value in light of the concerns of owner, asset, and dominion.
A. Three-dimensional Property Basics
Before embarking on our examination of how private parties and
lawmakers order property rights in three dimensions, we begin with
the simple observation that the definition of property rights must, by
its nature, involve delineation along the three dimensions of owner,
asset, and dominion. Consider, for example, the heart of Harold Dem29
setz’s famous analysis in Toward a Theory of Property Rights. Demsetz sought to explain how property rights naturally evolve whenever
a scarce resource becomes valuable, and he illustrated his thesis by describing the emergence of property rights in land—specifically, in hunting territories in Canada’s Labrador Peninsula. According to Demsetz,
private property rights emerged when it became sufficiently valuable to
30
those concerned to internalize benefits and costs.
This internalization can be accomplished only by specifying owner, asset, and dominion. The property right must specify the owner (in
whom the benefits and costs are internalized), the territory over which
this ownership extends, and the rights included in ownership. Indeed,
it is impossible to conceive of allocating property without specifying
all three aspects of ownership. There cannot be ownership in land
without some clear idea of who owns the land, what land is owned,
31
and what rights accrue to the owner as a result of her status.

29

Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347 (1967).
See id at 354.
31 Admittedly, one might conceive of another dimension of property specification: time.
However, as our example demonstrates, durability of property rights is easily accommodated
within the dimensions of asset and dominion.
30
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Like most writers, Demsetz assumed, without ever stating so explicitly, that the typical property right partakes of the Blackstonian ideal
of a single owner with absolute dominion (full internalization) over a
thing. In the example of the hunting grounds, this entails a single person
owning a marked-off area and having absolute rights over the area, including, most importantly, exclusion and use rights. The Blackstonian
ideal therefore serves as the idealized goal of property definition.
Upon further analysis, however, the surface attractiveness of the
Blackstonian ideal breaks down. The goal of providing a single owner
with absolute dominion over a thing often proves unreachable, leaving
owners and the policymakers the challenge of maximizing property
value as a function of three variables that do not always move in a
correlated fashion.
Consider, for example, the management of property rights in a
beautifully designed residential home. One might suspect that optimal
production of such homes would be achieved by defining legal property rights in such homes in absolute Blackstonian fashion, permitting
the potential builder of such a home to internalize all utility created
by such a home, thereby allowing the builder to calculate whether to
make the investment based on full internalized enjoyment and cost.
However, this initial impulse is probably wrong. The house will
almost certainly last beyond the lifetime of the builder, and the beauty
will almost certainly be enjoyed, at least in part, by passersby with
whom the builder will have no practical ability to bargain for internalization. This means that the utility of the home will certainly spill
over to nonowners. In particular, the utility enjoyed by the builderowner from the asset will necessarily end at her death; she may only
enjoy vicarious utility from the anticipation of her heirs’ or grantees’
enjoyment. In this example, as in many others, the Blackstonian model
of property rights cannot possibly create full internalization.
The optimal definition of property rights must compromise between the impulse to concentrate the property right in the hands of one
person—here the builder-owner—and the contrary impulse to divide
the property rights among those who will necessarily enjoy at least part
of the benefit of the “thing” in question—the home. Optimization of
property rights requires compromise upon at least one dimension.
Property rights may be adjusted along any or all three of the dimensions. The beautiful home with spillovers may be placed under the
ownership of the builder and passersby. The builder may be left with
full ownership of part of the building but be stripped of ownership of
the exterior (ownership of which might be handed over to passersby).
Or, most likely, both the ownership and asset configuration may be
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left intact, while some of the owner’s dominion rights to alter the
32
building’s exterior are stripped away.
Where asset reconfiguration is difficult, compromises in ownership structure or owner dominion are likely strategies. Consider, for
example, Robert Ellickson’s examination of ownership structures in
land. As Ellickson notes, scale efficiencies vary for assets among different uses and users:
For example, . . . the optimal territorial scale of the Coase College
campus, given its educational purposes, is 200 acres. But the optimal scale for exploitation of the oil pool beneath Coase is 7777
acres. And when Coase rents living space to a sophomore, an
optimal space is a[n] . . . interest in a 150-square-foot dormitory
33
room. and disaggregation of parcels in order to permit each use
Aggregation
as it becomes most efficient is not an easy matter. Moreover, most lands
have multiple simultaneous uses, meaning that for many purposes a
parcel size is suboptimal or supraoptimal for one particular use while
optimal for another. Sometimes, the result is various kinds of collective
34
ownership, such as kibbutzim. More often, the problems in asset size
are dealt with through compromised rights as embodied in zoning law.
However, the reification of property rights in Anglo-American
law means that, even in realty, asset configuration often plays a special
role in optimizing value given tensions along property’s three dimensions. While it is not easy physically to divide a home so as to provide
for different ownership of different rooms, it is less difficult to divide
abstract estates in land. For instance, the physical home may remain
intact while the abstract legal asset (that is, the fee simple) is divided
into two: a life estate and a remainder. This means that, in AngloAmerican law, asset reconfiguration often proves a better means of
maximizing property value than aggregating ownership or reducing the
35
package of ownership rights.
32 See, for example, United States v Blackman, 613 SE2d 442, 444–45 (Va 2005) (concerning
a servitude forcing the owner of a historical home to preserve its appearance).
33 Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1332–33 (cited in note 2).
34 See id at 1347–48.
35 Reification of rights, together with a post-Hohfeldian view of property rights as a “bundle of sticks,” poses a challenge for those examining the three dimensions of property. Specifically, if property is merely a collection of owner rights—dominion, in our terminology—what
does it mean to speak of a property “asset”? The answer is that even when the defined property
asset is purely an abstraction, it is still conceived of as distinct from the dominion over it. For
instance, if the property right consists of a right to profit from an idea, the idea is the asset; and
the profit right, the dominion. Property rules always partake of distinct dimensions of dominion
and asset because they are rights in rem. Thus, even if the protected res is merely abstract, it must
be defined or conceived of in some fashion before one can proceed to defining the rights comprising owner dominion.
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Three Dimensions of Private Ordering of Property

Private property owners work to maximize property value as a
function of three dimensions through contract. The importance of the
ownership-asset-dominion triangle in contractual arrangements is a
central theme in the property rights writings of Yoram Barzel (albeit
without explicit acknowledgement of the role of any of the three di36
mensions). Barzel sought to elaborate a model of the development of
what he termed “economic property rights” through contractual arrangements that exploit changes in private cost functions. Barzel’s
theory focuses on how private parties allocate property rights through
37
contract and other arrangements. While his work centers on value
allocation, a careful examination of the model reveals that, in Barzel’s
world, private parties take advantage of the three dimensions of own38
er, asset, and dominion in defining their property rights.
For example, Barzel observed that gas station owners responded
to changes in gasoline prices following conflicts in the Middle East not
39
only by rationing supplies according to waiting times in queue but
also by reconfiguring the asset sold. Deprived of the ability to reprice
the asset on account of price controls, station owners altered the asset
sold by reducing the quality of gasoline (measured by octane rating)
and stripped away auxiliary services previously bundled with the gaso36

See Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 33 (Cambridge 2d ed 1997).
See id at 33–54 (using the tenant-farmer–landlord relationship as an example of how
parties will maximize value by shifting contract form).
38 Barzel’s concept of property rights differs significantly from that generally embraced by
legal scholars and therefore requires some initial explanation. In contrast with the theories discussed in the previous Part, Barzel’s theory views property as a post hoc description of the ability to
enjoy value from a given service or asset. Notably, this description of property differs from a legal
package of rights or even a legal recognition of the ability to enjoy value. See id at 3. See also
Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?,
111 Yale L J 357, 358 (2001):
37

[U]pon closer inspection, all this property-talk among legal economists is not about any distinctive type of right. To [ ] a greater extent than even the legal scholars, modern economists
assume that property consists of an ad hoc collection of rights in resources. Indeed, there is
a tendency among economists to use the term property “to describe virtually every device—public or private, common-law or regulatory, contractual or governmental, formal or
informal—by which divergences between private and social costs or benefits are reduced.”
Quoting Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 53 (Aspen 5th ed 1998). The touchstone
of Barzel’s analysis is transaction cost economics as pioneered by Ronald Coase. In relevant part,
this branch of economics treats legal entitlements as unimportant so long as transaction costs are
sufficiently small. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 1–15 (1960). Thus,
Barzel had good reason to relegate questions of legal property to a secondary role in his investigation. Nonetheless, Barzel’s discussion of property rights is valuable in delineating the interplay
of the dimensions of property as understood by more traditional property scholarship.
39 See Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights at 24 (cited in note 36) (explaining
that by setting a price ceiling below the market-clearing price, a part of the rights to the gasoline
was placed in the public domain and could be acquired by buyers who joined the queue).
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line. Barzel similarly noted that assets conveyed in labor contracts
42
and realty rentals, and also asset and risk allocations such as insur43
ance contracts, were altered over time by the markets or by changes
in production and cost functions, whether due to regulation, improved
production techniques, or other developments.
Barzel also analyzed changes in ownership configurations in re44
sponse to production functions by examining the role of corporations,
45
46
split control through leaseholds, and other cooperative mechanisms in
the efficient exploitation of economic property rights. Barzel followed
Ronald Coase in viewing both property rights and organizational forms
47
as fundamental questions of transaction costs. However, Barzel reversed Coase’s order of priority by describing organizational forms as
seen through the lens of economic property rights. Barzel’s theory
sees sole ownership as an ideal that reduces transaction costs, but only
at the cost of decreasing the ability to specialize. Thus, ownership configurations, according to Barzel, aim to obtain the benefits of specialization by slicing up attributes of property so as to enable, as much as pos48
sible, each attribute to belong to a single owner.
For example, according to Barzel, the purpose of the firm is not to
divide ownership among many individuals, but rather, to provide a limited insurance mechanism to each of the individual worker-owners selling
49
50
their output. Corporations are not simply a network of contracts; they

40 Id at 27–29. Auxiliary services included pumping gas, washing windows, and checking
engine oil.
41 See id at 78–80 (explaining how contractual arrangements between workers and employers vary in order to expose each of the parties to different levels of variability).
42 See id at 45–49 (discussing how lease contract attributes, such as maintenance responsibilities, are assigned to the party that can better affect the value of the output by manipulating
that attribute).
43 See id at 60–62, 64 (noting that fire insurers are the “efficient owners” of a building’s
attribute of fire hazard since fire insurers, rather than titleholders, are specialists in minimizing
fire hazard).
44 See id at 65–84.
45 See id at 33–54 (“Together owners of labor and owners of land . . . will adopt the contract form that generates the largest net output value.”).
46 See id at 55–64 (examining the complex structuring of rights associated with large-scale
equipment and office buildings).
47 See id at 11 (“The presence of positive transaction costs is what makes the study of
property rights significant.”).
48 See id at 51–53.
49 See id at 81 (defining the scope of the firm as “the set of contracts whose variability is
contractually guaranteed by common equity capital”).
50 The description of corporations as a network of contracts was proposed by Michael
Jensen and William Meckling. See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 310–11
(1976) (describing most organizations as legal fictions, “which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals”) (emphasis omitted).
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are a network of single owners, each selling her property rights, together
51
with a network of guarantors providing limited financing.
Barzel’s analysis is particularly important for our purposes, as it
comes against Coase’s background view of legal definitions of prop52
erty as of purely secondary importance. Barzel’s work demonstrates
that even in the absence of legal restraints, owners and would-be owners constantly juggle their ownership to achieve the optimal combination of number of owners, asset control, and asset configuration. Different abilities to enjoy profits from specialization, changes in societal
tastes and technology, changing values of inputs, substitutes and complements, and a host of other factors combine to alter constantly the
value of ownership. Within the limitations imposed by transaction
costs, owners respond by altering one or more of the three factors to
return assets to the most productive use for them. Sometimes owners
rearrange ownership structures into corporations or other fictional
forms; sometimes they reconfigure their assets into different bundles;
sometimes they yield or seize rights of control over their assets. Owners may abandon parts of assets to the public domain in order to pro53
tect more cost-effectively what remains.
Assume, for example, a large empty tract of land, Largeacre, controlled by Jane. Jane can go about extracting value from Largeacre in
a variety of ways involving all three dimensions we discuss. She can
assert sole and complete dominion over the entire tract and use the
tract herself. She can hire the help of others in order to manage and
use the land, thereby yielding a certain degree of her dominion over
the tract. She can add other owners to help her manage and use the
land by creating a tenancy in common, thereby yielding a certain degree of her dominion over the tract. Alternatively, she can mortgage
part of the tract in order to raise money that she can then use to improve the land. She can subdivide into multiple lots and sell each of
the smaller lots to a different single owner. She can set up a corporation that would own Largeacre and sell shares in the corporation to
investors. Her decision on this score will involve some juggling of her
rights, the introduction of other “owners,” and configuring the asset or
dominion over it, all in order to maximize the value extracted from
her property rights. In short, in the Barzelian world, “owners” adjust
51 Whereas Jensen and Meckling’s theory is referred to as “nexus of contracts,” Barzel
refers to a firm as a “nexus of outcome guarantees.” Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property
Rights at 81 (cited in note 36).
52 See note 38.
53 See generally Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the
Optimal Value of an Asset, 31 J Legal Stud 339 (2002) (discussing optimizing asset value for
owners by partial destruction of the asset).
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their position along all three dimensions in an attempt to maximize
the value they derive from their assets.
The case of copyrights in musical compositions provides a real
world example of three-dimensional adjustment. One of the exclusive
rights the law grants to copyright owners is the right to perform the
54
work in public. The right to control public performances of musical
works is a potentially valuable right, but it is notoriously difficult to
55
enforce. Illegal public performances of musical works can occur in
multiple places at once, often leaving no trace of the infringement after the fact. These characteristics combine to make it very difficult for
individual copyright owners to extract the full value embedded in the
public performance right. The high cost of monitoring illegal performances and suing putative infringers make enforcement on an individual basis impractical.
Copyright owners responded to this challenge by forming performance rights collectives, such as American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc (BMI),
which manage and enforce public performance rights on a collective
56
basis. Individual owners chose to compromise their dominion by ceding their exclusive control over public performances of their works to
the aforementioned collectives and accepting in exchange a share of the
royalties collected by the organizations. Robert Merges described copyright owners’ decisions to opt in to a collective management and enforcement ownership as a transition from a strong property model, under
which each owner has full control of her works, to a liability rule model,
under which copyright owners voluntarily agree to accept the royalties
57
determined by their collective of choice. In our terminology, the copyright owners responded to the high cost of enforcing public perform58
ance rights by adjusting their rights on the dominion dimension.

54

See 17 USC § 106(4) (2000).
See, for example, Jay M. Fujitani, Comment, Controlling the Market Power of Performing
Rights Societies: An Administrative Substitute for Antitrust Regulation, 72 Cal L Rev 103, 105
(1984) (describing how “[t]he ephemeral nature of public performances [that] made it difficult
for copyright owners to detect unauthorized performances of their works” led to the creation of
organizations for the enforcement of performance rights).
56 See W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music Copyright, 92 Iowa L Rev 835, 844 (2007) (“ASCAP . . . is famous for stories of its employees, cloaked
in ASCAP-emblazoned jackets, patrolling local concerts, stores, restaurants, and nightclubs in
search of . . . businesses that perform songs publicly without permission.”). See also Stanley M.
Besen, Sheila N. Kirby, and Steven C. Salop, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 Va
L Rev 383, 385–90 (1992).
57 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Cal L Rev 1293, 1303 (1996).
58 An alternative owner-asset adjustment might involve copyright owners transferring the
copyrights themselves to the collectives.
55
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Over time, technology created a new challenge for copyright holders in musical works: filesharing. The emergence of the internet, together with email and peer-to-peer applications, greatly increased the
scope of unlawful exchange and distribution of music files. According to
some estimates, at the height of the practice, almost one billion files
59
were illegally shared every month.
Copyright owners adopted a two-pronged approach to the new
challenge. First, the content industry adopted encryption and other
technological protection measures to make copying more difficult.
Second, owners of valuable copyright portfolios persuaded Congress
to pass legislation enhancing the penalties for internet copying and
60
barring the circumvention of technological protection measures. The
new legislation expanded the powers of copyright holders vis-à-vis
potential file sharers by making it more difficult and costly for the
61
latter to access and use copyrighted content without permission.
Without the new legislation, the technological self-help measures were
of limited effectiveness since hackers always found ways to defeat
62
them. By siding with the copyright owners, Congress improved their
position of the copyright holders in the technological war they were
waging on hackers and file sharers. In our terms, once again, the legislation adjusted property rights along the dominion dimension.
But this was not the end of the story. Obviously, the new law
could not achieve absolute deterrence, and congressional intervention
was not enough on its own to end illegal filesharing. The ban on circumvention has proven to be difficult to enforce and many file sharers have

59 See Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, Hearings on S 2560 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (2004) (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman
and CEO, Recording Industry Association of America), online at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=1276&wit_id=3753 (visited June 8, 2008).
60 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub L No 105-304, 112 Stat 2860
(1998), codified in relevant part at 17 USC §§ 1201–05 (2000). For a discussion of the content
industry’s role in the enactment of the DMCA, see Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 122–49
(Prometheus 2001).
61 See Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 Yale L J 1575, 1640 (2002) (pointing out that “[m]ost users have neither the
inclination nor the ability to circumvent a technical protection measure”). See also Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? 107–25 (Oxford 2006) (describing how the litigation that marked the demise of Kazaa also meant that file trading groups avoiding government
detection would be harder to find by ordinary users).
62 See, for example, Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 Denver U
L Rev 13, 23 (2006) (noting that there are “no perfect, hacker-proof” technological protection
measures); Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act against the
Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures, 24 Loyola LA
Enter L Rev 635, 638 (2004) (“Proponents of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions were
not naïve about the technological infallibility of [technical protection measures]. They admitted that no technology would be foolproof against every hacker bent on compromising it.”).
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63

not been deterred. Given the low likelihood of enforcement, internet
users all over the world deem the cost savings from illegal filesharing
(forgone expenditures on CDs and the like) greater than the expected
cost from enhanced legal liability. This has led the music industry to
reconfigure its most valuable asset—the package by which it delivers
music (and attendant limited copyright licenses). The dominant package of prior decades—the music album on vinyl, tape, or CD—is es64
sentially a bundled good. It typically contains two or three hits and a
number of track fillers. Traditionally, music lovers had little use for the
track fillers but put up with them to enjoy the hits with which they
65
were bundled. However, filesharing gave music owners the opportunity to “unbundle” the good and gain direct access to hits they wanted.
Realizing this, in recent years, the music industry has altered the configuration of the asset by unbundling the package and selling music on
a per track basis. Online music sites, such as iTunes, sell music by the
66
song, affording buyers significant cost savings. Importantly, the reconfiguration of the assets lowered the attractiveness of illegal filesharing
in the United States. And in 2006, “[t]he number of households downloading legally almost caught up to the number of homes that down67
load illegally via peer-to-peer . . . file-sharing networks.”
C.

Three Dimensions of Public Ordering of Property

In the previous Part, we argued that when left to their own devices, private actors will naturally develop property rights that tend to
maximize value as a function of the three dimensions of ownership, asset configuration, and owner dominion. As we demonstrated in the example of filesharing, these rearrangements will often involve changes
in law as well as contractual arrangements. Ideally, lawmakers, too,
should aim for three-dimensional maximization. While the state is not
an “efficient” producer of property rights such that one should expect
the legal market to “clear” at optimal property rights definition, the
63 See von Lohmann, 24 Loyola LA Enter L Rev at 639 (cited in note 62) (stating that the
DMCA anticircumvention provisions have not been of any help to content owners). But see Paul
Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 UC Davis L Rev 1327, 1398 (2008).
64 See Christopher Sprigman, The 99¢ Question, 5 J Telecommun & High Tech L 87, 90–91
(2006).
65 Indeed, track fillers, or filler songs, are often called “throwaways.” Consider Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 BU L Rev 975, 1028 n 193 (2002)
(suggesting that “a full-length CD consists of four tracks that consumers want and another six to
eight tracks of filler songs”).
66 See, for example, Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-based Digital Rights Management, 5 J Telecommun & High Tech L 47, 67 (2006).
67 See Joseph Palenchar, NPD: Illegal Downloads Outpacing Legal Downloads, Twice (Mar
14, 2007), online at http://www.twice.com/article/CA6424429.html (visited June 8, 2008).
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state often maneuvers to improve property definitions at the request
68
of property “consumers” (constituents and lobbyists). Naturally, legally defined property must take account of all three dimensions.
To understand how lawmakers define property rights, we first
seek to ascertain the importance of government definition of property
rights in light of private autonomy in shaping contractual rights.
One function of government regulation is illustrated by the example of filesharing. State law is a collective action mechanism that in
some cases proves the most cost-effective way for private individuals
69
to arrange their property rights. Additionally, once government defines property rights, state definitions often take the place of (or re70
duce the price of) private contractual orderings. After all, why should
parties to a property contract reinvent the wheel and classify anew
their rights to utilize a given asset when they may adopt definitions
already provided by the state?
A second, more important function of government regulation of
property rights is to establish rights beyond the contractual scope of
parties to bargain with another—that is, in those cases where transaction costs bar effective bargaining between all potentially relevant
parties to ownership. This theme was developed in three interrelated
articles by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, who sought to explain
71
the importance of property law in a post-Coasean world. Merrill and
Smith argued that because property rights deal with an indefinitely
large class of individuals who may encounter a given asset, property
law is essential for managing the costs of conveying information about
72
rights. Property law accomplishes this by going beyond simply estab73
lishing default rules for contracting parties. Under the rule of nume68 Rent-seeking is prevalent in the production of legal property rules, as in any other political activity, and there is no reason to believe therefore that every property change will improve net welfare. Indeed, we discuss a number of badly designed property definitions in Part IV.
69 See Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights at 98–104 (cited in note 36) (discussing the government’s role in delineating property rights through dispute settlement and by placing assets which are very costly to police into the public domain); Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J Legal Stud 515, 518 (2002) (asserting that
where there is little risk of overuse of a common-pool asset, gains from more efficient allocation
of the asset may be offset by increases in administrative costs).
70 See, for example, Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1368–71 (cited in note 2).
71 See generally Merrill and Smith, 111 Yale L J 357 (cited in note 38); Thomas W. Merrill
and Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 Yale L J 1 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract
Interface, 101 Colum L Rev 773 (2001).
72 See Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 26–27 (cited in note 71) (justifying the numerus
clausus principle as a means for controlling an “externality involving measurement costs: Parties
who create new property rights will not take into account the full magnitude of the measurement
costs they impose on strangers to the title”).
73 See Merrill and Smith, 111 Yale L J at 394 (cited in note 38).
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rus clausus, property law limits the ability of private parties to create
74
new property forms contractually.
Viewed more broadly, Merrill and Smith’s property writings remind us that property rights, as defined by the government, are rights
in rem, which avail against the world—even those who have not bargained with the defined owner. Because the costs of transacting with
other potentially affected users of any given asset are often prohibitively high, the public definition of property rights is frequently dispo75
sitive. This means that while private ordering may determine the
shape of property rights in instances where the value of the order exceeds transaction costs (including, but not limited to, the information
costs described by Merrill and Smith), private parties will often find
that transaction costs are sufficiently high to bar such ordering. Consequently, for a wide range of potential users or possessors of assets,
the government definition of property rights is the important one.
The Blackstonian ideal of property as absolute dominion of a single owner over a thing retains broad political appeal, as can be seen in
such disparate political movements as opposition to eminent domain,
support for the use of force in defense of property, and demands for
sharper restrictions on the ability of law enforcement officials to enter
private homes. At the same time, it must be recognized that property
rights are not often easily bundled into neat Blackstonian packages.
Instead, the law must shuffle legal protections in order to maximize
the value of property rights over time as a function of the three crucial
elements of assets, unitary ownership, and dominion. This cannot be
accomplished by stubborn adherence to the Blackstonian ideal, but
rather by taking account of high transaction costs and expected variability in tastes and technology, and by defining and redefining property rights in order to encourage private management and facilitate
transferability and specialization. Sometimes, this occurs at the expense of one or the other of the Blackstonian ideals.
The goal of government-defined property rights is not to achieve
optimization in any individual bargain; this task may be left to the individual contracting parties at hand. Rather, lawmakers ideally define
property rights in order to achieve optimization in the many cases

74

See Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 4 (cited in note 71).
See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L Rev
531, 533 (2005) (“Because it is practically impossible for contracts to arrange most of society’s
relationships, property law determines most of the legal interactions regarding assets among
people.”); Merrill and Smith, 111 Yale L J at 393–94 (cited in note 38) (arguing that if property is
a bundle of rights, some bundles are much easier to communicate than others and therefore have
an information-cost advantage).
75
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where affected parties cannot bargain due to transaction costs. As with
private parties, lawmakers must work along all three dimensions.
Consider again the example of property rights in a durable and
beautiful house. Not only are many of the beneficiaries of utility from
the house outside of the reach of potential transactions (due to high
transaction costs), many are as yet unborn and cannot express any preferences whatsoever. In this case, a single owner of absolute dominion
over the entire home for eternity may well reconfigure property rights
in such a manner as to maximize her own utility to society’s aggregate
loss because the utility of passersby and future generations will be taken into account only to such a degree as the owner can enjoy vicarious
benefit. For example, the owner may impose a durable burden on title
in the home that produces a small amount of present psychic enjoyment
but that places a long-term high cost on the enjoyment of future generations. Lawmakers can work to counteract such developments by restricting the owner’s ability to reconfigure the asset and compromise
future owners’ rights by, for example, limiting the ability to impose
some kinds of restraints on alienability or by enforcement of a numerus
76
clausus rule that forbids willy-nilly creation of new estates in land.
In Part III, we consider more systematically the strategies actually
used by lawmakers to maximize property value given three-dimensional
tensions. We argue that, on closer analysis, many of the contours of
property law can be interpreted as lawmakers’ attempts, for better or
worse, to juggle the needs of the three dimensions of property. But we
first demonstrate, in Part II, how lack of attention to the threedimensionality of property problems has distorted our understanding
of central property themes.
II. THE MISSING DIMENSIONS OF PROPERTY ANALYSIS
In this Part, we discuss how the three-dimensionality of property
manifests itself in numerous doctrines. We illustrate three-dimensionality’s
importance in understanding the challenges of property law and show
how insufficient attention to this fact has led renowned property theorists astray.
A. The “Fragmentation” of Property Rights
We begin with some of the puzzles recognized in the writings of
Heller as well as Parisi. In a series of papers, Michael Heller identified a
problem that he labeled “excessive fragmentation of property rights”

76 To be sure, there is no reason to be certain that lawmakers will act correctly in order to
ensure optimal value preservation for future generations.
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77

and, in particular, the problem of anticommons. In Heller’s account,
anticommons occur where an asset is shared by too many owners possessing excessively small asset shares. This over-fragmentation of ownership creates a situation where no owner has sufficient power to utilize
the asset and none has sufficient incentive to jointly manage the asset
78
given high transaction costs. The result is underutilization of property.
Heller built on this insight to explain and justify several of property’s
most exotic doctrines. For example, Heller described the “tortuous Rule
Against Perpetuities” as an attempt to “limit inter-temporal fragmenta79
tion.” Likewise, he explained the numerus clausus principle that limits
80
private creation of new property forms on the same grounds.
Heller also criticized some property doctrines for opening the
door to excessive fragmentation. For example, he noted that the law of
servitudes permits division and allocation of property rights in order to
encourage “good fragmentation” but cautioned that the law’s flexibility
might serve as a “one way ratchet,” leading to over-fragmentation, lock81
ing property into suboptimal uses. This, he said, is a particular danger
facing common-interest developments (such as condominium buildings and gated communities), which deliberately create extensive net82
works of reciprocal servitudes.
Extending Heller’s analysis, Parisi described the tendency toward
excessive fragmentation as a one-directional bias towards entropy in
83
property. Parisi argued that the problem might be even more troubling than Heller might have realized, due to asymmetric transaction
costs: while the cost of dividing property among multiple holders is
84
quite low, the cost of reaggregating it is often prohibitive.
77 See generally Heller, 111 Harv L Rev 621 (cited in note 8); Heller, 108 Yale L J 1163
(cited in note 11); Michael A Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 Theoretical
Inquiries in L 79 (2001) (proposing anticommons as a fourth ideal type of property, to be added
to the standard trilogy of private, commons, and state property). The concept was first introduced
by Frank Michelman. See Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in J.
Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds, NOMOS XXIV: Ethics, Economics, and the Law 3, 6
(NYU 1982).
78 See Heller, 111 Harv L Rev at 633–42 (cited in note 8).
79 Heller, 108 Yale L J at 1179 (cited in note 11).
80 See id at 1177 (noting how judges reduced the costs of intertemporal fragmentation by
restricting the fee tail).
81 See id at 1183–84 (explaining how fragmenting governance among a group of owners
may promote good fragmentation), 1165–66 (noting that “[b]ecause of high transaction costs,
strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases, people may find it easier to divide property than to
recombine it”).
82 See id at 1183–85 (predicting that without the restriction of members’ veto rights, common-interest communities “may fall further and further behind their productivity frontier”).
83 See Parisi, 50 Am J Comp L at 626–27 (cited in note 8).
84 See id at 627. For other discussions of the fragmentation problem in property, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw U L Rev 907 (2004); Reza Dibadj,
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By our lights, the important contributions of Heller and Parisi fall
short of their full potential by paying insufficient attention to the
three-dimensionality of property. As their terminology suggests, both
tend to view asset size as a given and focus on the number and type of
85
ownership shares. Thus, each focuses on the danger of excessive
fragmentation of ownership while failing to notice that in some cases
the law must encourage fragmentation of ownership shares in order to
maximize value on other axes. For instance, in many common-interest
developments, the ideal asset configuration for unit owners includes a
series of servitudes ensuring quiet, clean and safe surroundings, neighbors with similar preferences for local amenities, and aesthetically
harmonious exteriors. From a condominium unit owner’s perspective,
the problem may be not that a large asset is divided among too many
owners, but rather that alternative asset configurations are too small
or ill-fitting to ensure all the attributes that they want in their property. Owning a unit in a common-interest development enables owners to achieve new asset configurations that allow them to enjoy
amenities without having to assemble all the attributes they value into
one large individually owned parcel. The clash between the demands
of the asset configuration (maximum value at substantial “fragmentation” of unit ownership) and single ownership (maximum value at
zero “fragmentation”) leads, in such cases, to overall maximum value
at substantial fragmentation. Thus, it is not surprising that many individuals are eager to live in common-interest developments notwithstanding limitations that should theoretically lower asset value. Nor is
it surprising that courts have been willing to develop the law of servitudes in ways that encourage fragmentation.
By focusing on fragmentation, Heller and Parisi do not pay sufficient heed to the fact that property law not only seeks to block too
many owners but also to drive toward an optimal asset configuration.
Thus “fragmentation” that looks undesirable on one dimension because
it creates too many owners looks highly desirable on another dimension because it creates the optimal “thing” subject to property. This
claim can be stated more broadly: the fragmentation other theorists
view as an anomaly appears very rational when one includes the dimenRegulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 Ohio St L J 1041 (2003); Hsu, 36 UC Davis L Rev
813 (cited in note 13); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 Cal L Rev 439, 509–13 (2003); James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J L & Econ 1 (2000).
85 It should be noted, though, that Parisi also analyzes the dominion-related aspects of
fragmentation. See Parisi, 50 Am J Comp L at 609–10, 614–15 (cited in note 8). See also Ben W.F.
Depoorter and Francesco Parisi, Fragmentation of Property Rights: A Functional Interpretation of
the Law of Servitudes, 3 Global Jurist Frontiers, Issue 1, Article 2, at 3 (2003), online at http://
www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol3/iss1/art2/ (visited June 8, 2008).
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sion of asset size and configuration in the analysis. Indeed, in a threedimensional model of property law, oftentimes the law must be as concerned with insufficient fragmentation as with excessive fragmentation.
B.

Commons Property

In her work, Carol Rose has studied various common property
forms. Rose has posited that the persistence of common property poses a puzzle to champions of private property, who maintain that common property regimes lead to overuse of assets and depletion of resources. She has noted that “the nineteenth-century common law of
property in both Britain and America, with surprising consistency,
86
recognized two distinguishable types of public property.” The first is
87
“property ‘owned’ and actively managed by a governmental body.”
The other is “property collectively ‘owned’ and ‘managed’ by society
at large, with claims independent of and indeed superior to the claims
of any purported governmental manager”—a category that most
would call common property but that Rose dubs “inherently public
88
property.” Rose has pointed out that the law employed such doctrines as prescriptive easements, public trust, and custom to protect
the claims of the general public
to such assets as pathways, waterways,
89
shores, and hunting grounds.
Why did those assets remain inherently public? One cause is fear
of monopolization and holdouts. Rose used this rationale to justify the
90
recognition of public rights in passageways. She pointed out, though,
that the holdout rationale is unpersuasive when applied to “such pub91
lic trust uses as swimming, fishing, and hunting.” Recreational uses
may occur in many different places and hence there is no reason to
92
grant use rights to the public in a specific lot. Therefore Rose explained the legal recognition of public rights in recreational uses on
the grounds of economies of scale and maximization of group welfare.
For instance, Rose argued that value would rise for each participant in
a periodic communal dance as each new participant joined. In her
words, recreational activities “have value precisely because they reinforce the solidarity and fellow-feeling of the whole community; thus

86 Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U Chi L Rev 711, 720 (1986).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See id at 722.
90 See id at 752 (“Without public prescription doctrine, each owner along the way might
bar the passage at will and siphon off its public value.”).
91 Id at 758.
92 Id.
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the more members of the community who participate, even if only as
93
observers, the better for all.”
An obvious difficulty with Rose’s reliance on economies of scale
and network effects is that they do not lend any particular support for
favoring common property over private property. Telecommunications
display strong network effects—that is, within a range, the addition of
each user increases the value of the service for all others—yet the net94
work is predicated on private property. The same is true of credit cards
95
and various types of computer software such as operating systems.
The three-dimensional view offers an alternative way to understand the problem. The existence of common properties is indeed at
odds with property law’s preference for a single owner. However,
ownership, or the number of owners, is not the only dimension the law
must optimize. When asset size or configuration is added to the analysis, it becomes apparent that in some cases the ideal number of owners
is not necessarily one.
The choice between a single private owner and multiple owners
involves an important tradeoff. Private ownership sometimes gives
rise to a problem of underconsumption. This problem occurs when
assets are too large to be consumed by a single individual but extraordinarily costly or physically impossible to divide. In such cases, optimal
use of the assets requires the owner to share the consumption of the
asset with others. However, such sharing involves transaction costs. As
a result, some particularly large assets may remain underutilized.
Common property, as was noted numerous times in the past, displays
96
the opposite problem of overconsumption.
Accordingly, where very large assets are concerned, lawmakers
face a choice between two types of costs. They can push towards dividing and reconfiguring the asset into smaller units and establishing private property rights in the smaller units or subject it to common property and accept the cost of overconsumption. Depending on their particular configuration, there can be assets for which the cost of reconfiguration and privatization are greater than the cost of overconsumption. For example, the cost of formalizing and enforcing rights in navigable waters might be much higher than the cost of overuse under

93

Id at 767–68.
Compare Mark A. Lemley and Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 Tex L Rev 783, 812 (2007) (explaining how the failure of the FCC’s unbundling
program in the telecommunications industry can be attributed to a misunderstanding of “semicommons” property, where one firm has legal access to use the private property of another).
95 See Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 Geo Mason L Rev 673, 673 (1999).
96 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244 (1968).
94
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common property. In such cases, it makes sense to subject the asset to
common ownership.
C.

First Possession

In an important contribution to the canon of property scholarship, Richard Epstein discussed the centrality of the concept of a sin97
gle owner to the design of efficient legal rules. Epstein argued that
when high transaction costs prevent efficient allocation of resources
through contracts, lawmakers should “refer to the test of the ‘single
owner’ as a way to think about structuring legal relationships across
separate persons in a way that maximizes their joint output, when co98
operative behavior among them is not possible.” According to Epstein, the turn to the single-owner test will best aid the government in
attempting to approximate the results of hypothetical transactions
among private actors when high transaction costs prevent such transacting from actually occurring. Epstein proceeded to note that in designing specific doctrines, lawmakers should consider the potential of
99
the rules to generate externalities and holdouts.
Epstein used this framework to explain such property doctrines
as first possession. He defended first possession as a principle of appropriation of rights. Epstein admitted that the doctrine of first pos100
session itself creates negative externalities. However, he justified it
on the ground that it lowers correction costs relative to alternative
101
collective allocation mechanisms. In a world with positive transaction costs, pace Epstein, the cost of correcting mistakes in the initial
allocation far outweigh the negative externalities generated by the
102
first possession doctrine.
Epstein next turned his attention to the question of dominion, or
design of the optimal bundle of rights, that first possession should receive. He maintained that the common law’s decision to fashion ownership to entail “possession, use and disposition [ ] is an effort to overcome the problem of subsequent transactions costs by giving a single
103
person the control over all relevant aspects of a single thing.”
Unfortunately, Epstein stopped short of addressing the third dimension of asset specification, disposing of it by simply referring to all
97

See Epstein, 36 J L & Econ at 562–63 (cited in note 8).
Id at 556.
99 See id at 557 (maintaining that “the purpose of all legal rules is to minimize the sum of
the costs that are associated with these two forms of bargaining obstacles”).
100 See id at 561.
101 See id at 562 (basing this statement on “[a] rough empirical guess”).
102 See id at 562–63.
103 Id at 562 (emphasis added).
98
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objects of first possession as “thing[s].” From a three-dimensional lens,
the issue of asset specification is crucial, and, without reference to it, it is
impossible to offer a comprehensive justification for first possession.
104
Consider the celebrated case of Johnson v M’Intosh. This case is
(in)famous for its discussion of the principle of discovery as the basis
for acquisition of property rights in land. The principle of discovery,
however, says nothing about how to determine the assets that may be
acquired by discovery. Does the discoverer—or in this case, the conqueror—acquire rights only in the entire North American continent?
In all the lands that were not yet possessed by another European
power? In land stretching as far as the eye can see? Or only in land on
105
which it set foot?
Naturally, the determination of the assets to be gained has important efficiency implications. The greater the territory, the greater is the
holdout problem and the subsequent correction costs that concern
Epstein. Inattention to the dimension of assets invariably changes the
relative efficiency of alternative acquisition rules, and the analysis
cannot proceed without reference to this aspect.
To illustrate, let us turn to the issue of water rights. In Colorado,
the first appropriator of water obtains rights not only in the amount
she actually puts to a beneficial use but also to a share in the common
106
pool. In Massachusetts, by contrast, the first appropriator does not
107
acquire any particular rights in the pool. Rather, if she is a riparian
owner, she receives a right to a reasonable use of the pool subject to
the like uses of other riparian owners. Neither rule corresponds to the
classic first possession rule in which one owns all that one seizes. Simply focusing on the priority of the first actor does not help resolve how
to define the scope of the property right obtained.

104 21 US 543 (1823). See also Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 19 L & Hist Rev 67, 69 (2001) (contending that the M’Intosh rule served as
a cost-effective way for Europeans to expropriate Native American lands but that there was no
real dispute in this case since the parties did not truly have conflicting claims to the land).
105 For other discussions of the doctrine of discovery, see generally Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Chief Justice John Marshall and the Doctrine of Discovery: Friend or Foe to the Indians?, 42 Tulsa
L Rev 125 (2006).
106 See, for example, Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Co, 6 Colo 443 (1882) (establishing the Colorado doctrine of first appropriation). For further discussion, see David B. Schorr, Appropriation
as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of Property Rights, 32 Ecology L Q 3 (2005)
(contending that the Colorado rule was intentionally designed to prevent control of water by
capitalists and embodies an antimonopolistic, agrarian ideal).
107 See, for example, Stratton v Mt. Hermon Boys’ School, 103 NE 87, 88 (Mass 1913) (denying an absolute right of property in water and stating that “[t]he use of the water flowing in a
stream is common to all riparian owners and each must exercise this common right so as not
essentially to interfere with an equally beneficial enjoyment of the common right by his fellow
riparian owners”).
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The different evolution of water rights in different states demonstrates why one must heed all three dimensions. When analyzed on
one or two dimensions alone, acquisition rules may look very similar
to one another. Once the dimension of assets is added to the mix, it
becomes clear that ostensibly similar rules can lead to dramatically
different results.
D. Nuisance
Nuisance law is designed to deal with the problem of externalities
among property owners. It provides a cause of action for private nuisance whenever a property owner uses her land in a way that substantially (and unreasonably) interferes with the use and enjoyment of
108
land by other owners. Most modern theorists have analyzed the
109
problem of nuisance by focusing on the dimension of dominion. For
example, Henry Smith pointed out that nuisance doctrine oscillates between an exclusion model and a governance (or management) model.
In some instances—depending on the specific circumstances of the
case—the law grants an aggrieved owner exclusion rights against the
creator of the nuisance whereas in others the law seeks to reconcile
the conflicting land uses of the parties by establishing more detailed
110
and nuanced management rules.
In a similar vein, Epstein noted that the design of nuisance doctrine reflects a balance of the twin forces that obstruct efficient alloca111
tion of resources: externalities and holdouts. If the law grants property
owners very weak protection against nuisance, there will be a serious
externalities problem. If, on the other hand, the law gives very strong
protection against nuisance, property owners will not be able to conduct
high-value activities that impact neighboring lots without first negotiating permission from the affected neighbors. Under such a regime, a serious holdout problem will emerge. Nuisance doctrine is sensitive to
both these concerns. It entitles aggrieved property owners to a remedy
only when the interference with their use and enjoyment is substantial
112
(as opposed to trifling). Moreover, when the value of the activity giv108 See W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 87 at 622–23 (West 5th ed 1984)
(discussing the requirements for recovery on a private nuisance theory).
109 See, for example, Richard R. Powell, 6 The Law on Real Property § 64.02[1]–[3] at 64-10
to 64-13 (Matthew Bender 2007) (Michael Allan Wolf, ed) (explaining nuisance law as setting
restrictions on owners’ power to use land in certain ways).
110 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va L Rev
965, 974–75 (2004) (asserting that information costs can explain how regimes of exclusion and
governance define entitlements in nuisance law).
111 See Epstein, 36 J L & Econ at 557, 573 (cited in note 8).
112 Id at 575 (explaining that the law should not grant injunctive relief for every minor
interference because of the massive holdout potential).
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ing rise to the nuisance is very high, the remedy awarded to successful
113
plaintiffs will typically be damages (as opposed to injunctive relief).
Neither Smith nor Epstein fully explores the three dimensions of
the nuisance problem. They both assume a single owner and seek to
deal with the externalities problem by adjusting the owner’s bundle of
rights. However, in principle, the problem of nuisance could have been
dealt with by adjusting asset size or asset characterization. For example, if all land were under single ownership there would be no need for
nuisance law as no nuisances would ever arise. Thinking about the
problem from an assets perspective suggests that one way to minimize
external effects among neighbors would be to increase lot sizes or by
changing asset configurations. Indeed, zoning law serves this purpose
by restricting certain uses to certain areas. Among other things, zoning
ordinances attempt to separate industrial uses from residential ones,
114
designating each use category to a different area.
Introducing the asset dimension to the analysis yields a very interesting insight about the socially optimal approach to nuisances. Epstein’s article is an expansion of—and a tribute to—Ronald Coase’s
seminal article in which he established the connection between nui115
sance and transaction costs. Nuisance disputes are born out of two
problems: externalities and transaction costs. The former problem
gives rise to the dispute while the latter is the main obstacle to solving
it privately through negotiations.
In principle, lawmakers could eliminate all nuisance disputes by
fully specifying property rights that concentrate all ownership over every
possible thing that may be affected in one person or by configuring assets in a way that would prevent all spillovers. For example, in a world
in which all land were owned by a single owner, no nuisance disputes
would ever arise. Such a solution, however, will come at an enormous
cost to society. Configuring assets in a way that would prevent all nuisances would be devilishly expensive, and the cost of concentrating all
land in a single owner would result in a dramatic loss of value.

113 See, for example, Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co, Inc, 257 NE2d 870, 873 (NY 1970)
(granting an injunction to be vacated upon payment of permanent damages by the cement factory to neighboring landowners). See also Epstein, 36 J L & Econ at 576 (cited in note 8)
(explaining that remedies are a function of the inverse relationship between externalities and
holdouts and suggesting that a damage remedy is appropriate when the externality imposed on
the plaintiff is much smaller than the holdout problem).
114 This goal lies at the very core of zoning. See Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co, 272
US 365, 390 (1926) (noting that the crux of recent zoning legislation was “the creation and maintenance of residential districts, from which business and trade of every sort, including hotels and
apartment houses, are excluded”).
115 See Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 16 (cited in note 38).
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Accordingly, it is better to adopt an approach to nuisance that
seeks to achieve a compromise on all three dimensions, concentrating
most rights over manageably small assets in the hands of a large number of distinct single owners. This implies a conscious acceptance of a
certain level of nuisance in society. We agree to live with nuisances
because we believe that the cost of resolving nuisance disputes, though
real, are much lower than the cost of configuring assets in ways that
internalize all externalities. The asset dimension offers a way to resolve nuisance suits, but it is not cost-effective.
E.

Eminent Domain

The power of eminent domain allows the government to force
property owners to transfer their title to the government in exchange
116
for the payment of just compensation. The standard economic justification for this power is that without it land assembly effort will run
aground due to holdouts. For example, Judge Posner refers to the hol117
douts as “[t]he only justification” for the power of eminent domain.
Current theorizing, therefore, conceives of eminent domain as a solution to a problem of too many owners, each of whom wields the power
to stop socially efficient projects. The power to take involuntarily allows the government to overcome holdouts and replace multiple owners of the necessary plots with a single owner—namely the government itself. This conceptualization of eminent domain is so entrenched
in the minds of both scholars and students that it has blinded us to the
possibility of alternative ways of thinking about the problem.
From a three-dimensional perspective, the underlying problem is
not necessarily one of too many owners but rather of suboptimally
configured assets. Assume that the government needs a large tract to
construct a military base. The government would need to resort to
land assembly only if there are not any individual tracts of adequate
size. If there were sufficiently large tracts, fewer holdout problems
would arise, and the government could acquire title to one or more of
the tracts through voluntary negotiations.
The focus on asset size and configuration is not merely a theoretical nicety, leading to a different conceptualization of the problem.
As we shall see later in the Article, it also offers an array of new ap-

116

See US Const, Amend V.
Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv L Rev 32, 93 (2005) (referring
to eminent domain as an “almost random form of taxation” that enriches the government at the
expense of the private landowner and is only justified in a very narrow set of circumstances).
117

File: 3 - Bell-Parchomovsky Final 0904

2008]

Created on: 9/4/2008 6:55:00 PM

Last Printed: 10/1/2008 5:26:00 PM

Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions

1043

proaches to situations that have been thought to require transfer of
118
title via eminent domain.
III. THREE-DIMENSIONAL STRATEGIES
Having demonstrated the importance of three-dimensionality to
property, we now turn to the specific strategies employed by lawmakers in light of that three-dimensionality. In order to maximize the value of property rights across society, lawmakers have to maximize their
value as a function of three variables that do not always move in the
same direction—owner, asset, and dominion.
The framework developed in this Article makes it possible to divide property doctrine into six distinct categories intended to reconcile the inherent tension that exists among the three dimensions. It is
important to emphasize at the outset that we do not argue that these
strategies were consciously devised by lawmakers. In other words, we
do not offer in this Part a theory of how property rights are developed
119
in the political arena or an evolutionary account of property law. We
merely seek to explain how property rules have been grouped in the
past in response to three-dimensional challenges and, thereby, to advance a coherent view of property law that arises from our threedimensional approach.
Furthermore, we do not argue that our proposed categorization is
the only possible one or even that it covers the field of all possible
strategies. We readily admit that competing conceptualizations of
property doctrines are possible. Yet, until such competing conceptualizations are offered, we posit that our three-dimensional approach offers an important perspective on property law in its entirety.
In the remainder of this Part, we outline the six reconciliatory
strategies and demonstrate how they have been used. We would like
to emphasize at the outset that the six strategies are not mutually exclusive, and, indeed, in the proceeding discussion we will highlight areas of overlap. We posit that these strategies hold the key for understanding extant property law. Additionally, we submit that comprehending the interplay of the strategies and identifying their relative
advantages unlocks the hidden potential for superior solutions to
many of property’s dilemmas. Finally, we suggest that a better understanding of these strategies and their three-dimensional motivations

118

See Part IV.D.
Compare generally Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J
Legal Stud 421 (2002) (advancing a theory that transaction costs and interest groups drove the
movement of property from the commons to privatization and, in several instances, back again to
a more open-access arrangement).
119
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creates a starting point for more deliberate and targeted use of these
strategies in the future, as well as possibly suggesting new and as yet
undeveloped strategies.
A. Fictional Owners
The first strategy we discuss is lawmakers’ recognition of a fictional owner in order to concentrate ownership in a single owner, even
though many persons share actual ownership.
Often, a given property item’s asset configuration is such that the
asset is too large for a single owner to exercise absolute dominion. But
it is advantageous to reconfigure the owner in order to reach a single
owner, rather than reconfigure or divide the asset. The most obvious
instance of a large asset is a big physical item, like a skyscraper. However, the asset need not be a single physical thing—indeed, many of
the cases in which the law employs the strategy of a “fictional owner”
involve compound assets that combine many physical items. For instance, the single largest asset may be a business, which comprises
many discrete and smaller items, including intangible assets such as
goodwill. For obvious reasons, however, managing the business as a
whole, rather than separate management of the component items, may
120
sometimes produce great social utility.
While corporations are the most outstanding (and widely used)
form of fictional owner, property law abounds with examples outside
the corporate context. Married couples are considered a single owner120 Ronald Coase paved the way for the “make or pay” analysis—whether corporations
should produce components or services internally, or purchase on the market. See generally R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937) (theorizing that firms arise in order to
economize on transaction costs because the higher the cost of transacting externally on the
market, the greater the comparative advantage of producing a firm’s needs internally). Since
Coase’s pathbreaking article, an extensive literature has developed. See generally, for example,
Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organizations, 62 Am Econ Rev 777 (1972) (exploring the team productive process and why it induces
the contractual formation of the firm); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A.
Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J L
& Econ 297 (1978) (describing how the potential postcontractual extraction of high rents induces
parties to integrate vertically rather than contract); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J L & Econ 233 (1979) (using the three
dimensions of frequency, investment idiosyncrasy, and uncertainty to characterize transaction
costs and match them with appropriate governance structures); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (Free Press 1985) (describing the analytical framework of transaction cost economics and applying it to different
contractual settings); Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89
Colum L Rev 1757 (1989) (finding the transaction cost economics model of the firm unconvincing and advancing a property-rights approach in which firms are characterized by their nonhuman assets); Bengt Holmström and John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J
Econ Perspectives 73 (1998) (arguing for a broader view of the firm than has been provided by
either transaction cost economics or property rights theory).
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121

ship unit for some purposes, as are many other types of partner122
ships. Trusts have a separate legal personality that owns the assets in
123
place of the beneficiaries. By a like token, decedents’ estates replace
the deceased as “owner” of her property until final distribution of the
124
assets and winding up of the estate.
In all these instances, recognition of a single fictional owner permits the fictional owner to manage the large asset as an individual,
even though the fictional owner may itself be a compound person,
such as a public corporation. From a property perspective, bestowing
legal rights on corporations and other fictional owners places formal
ownership of the corporate assets in the hands of the corporations,
while giving individual shareholders only partial ownership of the
corporation itself, rather than the assets.
This recognition of the corporation as a separate “personality,”
rather than a collection of individuals tied together through a network
of contracts, preserves many of the most important benefits of property law. First, the fiction of a corporate person preserves the ability of
a single individual (or small number of individuals) to dispose of good
title to an asset, even while the controlling individual remains respon125
sible to many others under related bodies of law. This reduces transaction costs by permitting those dealing with the corporation to rely
126
upon the decisions of the authorized individuals without having to
seek approval of all or most of the “real” owners (that is, shareholders).
Effectively, corporate ownership strips each individual shareholder of
her power to exclude and grants this power to the group of sharehold-

121 See, for example, the discussion of tenancies by the entirety in Sawada v Endo, 561 P2d
1291, 1295 (Hawaii 1977) (holding that the tenancy by the entirety is predicated upon the legal
unity of husband and wife in single ownership and cannot be conveyed or reached by execution
through either spouse alone).
122 See Robert W. Hillman, Allan W. Vestal, and Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act § 201(a) at 79 (West 2006) (“A partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.”).
123 See Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative
Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 NYU L Rev 434, 472 (1998).
124 See generally, for example, Joint Properties Owners, Inc v Deri, 113 AD2d 691 (NY App
Div 1986) (noting that the leasehold interest does not terminate upon the lessee’s death but passes
as personal property to the decedent’s estate).
125 For further discussion, see generally Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-based Approach to
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 Colum L Rev 1203 (2002) (proposing to hold
controlling shareholders liable for corporate torts and statutory violations based on their level of
involvement).
126 See generally Coase, 4 Economica 386 (cited in note 120); Williamson, 22 J L & Econ
233 (cited in note 120); Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J L & Econ 301 (1983) (arguing that the separation of decisionmaking and riskbearing functions survives in large corporations because it can control agency problems and
effectively use specific knowledge in decisionmaking).
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ers as a whole, through various voting mechanisms. A prospective
buyer of a corporately owned parcel of land can obtain the same title
as she would in purchasing the land from an ordinary private owner
simply by contracting with a duly authorized corporate agent without
worrying herself with any of the formalities of the internal corporate
decisionmaking process.
Second, the fiction discourages configuration of assets into suboptimally small sizes and instead creates a mechanism for preserving
assets at their optimal size. Where individuals cannot aggregate owner
shares into larger fictional owners, they often find that an asset, as ordinarily configured, is too large for their purposes. This may be for the
mundane reason that the asset is so valuable that it takes up too much
128
of the owner’s asset portfolio and blocks diversification of asset risk.
Or, it may be because the asset itself is of such a physical size that it
cannot cost-effectively be used by a single individual. Without the option of preserving the larger asset configuration through the ownership
of a “larger” fictional owner, individual owners might frequently find
that they enhance their own utility by destroying asset value, causing an
129
unfortunate and unnecessary loss of utility to society.
The fictional owner strategy thereby preserves many of the advantages of property law in enhancing social utility derived from asset
management by compromising along the owner axis in order to preserve optimal asset configuration. Further, by aggregating the owners
into a fictional unity, property law minimizes the dissipation of utility
caused by splitting assets among too many owners.
B.

Fictional Assets

Another strategy the law employs is the creation of fictional assets. The “reification” of property rights in Anglo-American law has
often been dismissed as an excessively formalistic device or even a
130
philosophical error. Yet the strategy of fictional assets offers a solu127 See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule?, 70 S
Cal L Rev 741, 743 (1997) (“Although an investor’s decision to join an investors’ group is made on
an individual basis . . . from that moment onward . . . most decisions must be made collectively.”).
128 See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning,
44 Eur Econ Rev 807–17 (2000) (discussing the importance of organizational law in permitting a
better match of asset packages for different tastes and desires for risk).
129 For a fascinating exploration of situations in which an owner will find it cost effective to
destroy asset value to maximize owner utility, see generally Allen, 31 J Legal Stud 339 (cited in
note 53).
130 See, for example, Douglas Litowitz, Reification in Law and Legal Theory, 9 S Cal Interdiscipl L J 401, 401 (2000) (“As applied to law, reification represents a kind of infection . . . because
it is essentially an error, a delusion, and a mystification that blinds people to alternative legal arrangements by ‘naturalizing’ the existing legal system as inevitable.”).
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tion to two distinct problems. First, by permitting the recognition of
property rights in fictional assets, property law extends its scope to
intangible and abstract items of value like ideas and expressions. Second, by permitting ownership of abstractions, the fictional asset strategy permits dividing ownership of large physical objects among several owners while still minimizing transaction costs. In each case, the
fictional asset permits adherence to the ideal package of ownership,
asset, and dominion by configuring the asset into a form amenable to
the standard property package.
Let us examine each of these two advantages in turn.
The most obvious instance of ownership of abstract assets can be
found in the law of intellectual property. Intellectual property law recognizes and protects rights in intangible informational assets. The de131
fining characteristic of intellectual goods is their lack of physicality.
While many intellectual goods need a physical embodiment for marketing purposes, it is the informational content—and not the physical
embodiment—that is the subject of intellectual property protection.
Due to their intangible nature, intellectual assets do not have clear
boundaries. Indeed, defining the boundaries of intellectual assets is
132
one of the most difficult challenges lawmakers must confront. Yet,
without legal protection, much of the value inherent in intellectual
133
goods would be lost. Because the initial production of intellectual
goods often necessitates considerable investment and once produced
they can be copied at a very low cost, there is a serious risk that not
enough intellectual goods would be created without legal protection.
Hence, the recognition of fictional assets, in this context, is deemed
necessary to ensure adequate production of certain types of informa134
tional content.
Even for physical objects, the fictional asset strategy is pervasive
and important. By permitting owners to slice up a physical “thing”
into slices small enough to be amenable to full dominion by a single
owner, the law maintains single owners with relatively uncompromised dominion (subject only to the rules of waste) over full and separate—albeit fictional—assets, instead of having to acknowledge multiple owners over the same asset. While property law concerns “things”
131 See Dan L. Burk, Transborder Intellectual Property Issues on the Electronic Frontier, 6 Stan
L & Policy Rev 9, 9–10 (1994) (explaining that “[u]nlike physical goods, intellectual goods lack the
barriers that would allow their investors to prevent their free appropriation by consumers”).
132 See, for example, Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?,
84 Tex L Rev 395, 429–30 (2005) (discussing the difficulties involved in defining the boundaries
of ideas and inventions).
133 See Burk, 6 Stan L & Policy Rev at 9 (cited in note 131).
134 See, for example, Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect
Patent Protection and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 San Diego L Rev 987, 991 (2000).
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and therefore naturally gravitates toward recognizing ownership in
physical items, the law also readily recognizes ownership in abstractions. Indeed, the reification of property rights in Anglo-American law,
beginning in the Middle Ages, resulted in viewing all ownership interests in property as attached not to physical items at all, but rather to
135
abstract estates that denote packages of rights regarding those items.
Under the estate system, an owner of real property never owns the
136
underlying realty, but rather an estate in the realty. If Sarah owns
Blackacre, the estate system dictates that she does not own the land
itself, but rather a fee simple absolute estate in Blackacre.
The estate system creates valuable distinctions that improve the
ability to manage assets. The central feature of the estate system is its
division of ownership along a temporal axis. Estates are divided between present and future interests; both kinds of estates are real interests that may currently be transferred and otherwise dealt with, but
137
only the present interests contain a present right of possession. Future interests contain only a future right of possession. Since the life of
most assets in realty is much longer than that of human beings, the
estate system made it possible to slice up the life of assets into smaller
time periods and make a single person the owner of each discrete
smaller (albeit abstract) asset. Thus, Jonathan, with a life estate in
Blackacre, would own a real asset in a size that he could use during his
lifetime, while leaving to Keith (the remainderman), an asset that Jonathan would manage less well. Yet, because each estate is a distinct
asset, many of the advantages of the Blackstonian property ideal—
such as easy alienability—are maintained.
138
This strategy is exemplified in the case of Gruen v Gruen. There
a father wished to give his son a painting by Gustav Klimt as a twentieth birthday gift but continue to retain possession of the painting dur139
ing his own life. In this case, the existence of a fictional asset—the
vested remainder—enabled the father both to enjoy the painting during his life and to give his son a gift of that part of the value of the
painting that the father could not enjoy. If fictional assets did not exist,
the father could attempt to achieve the same result by bequeathing
135 Jesse Dukeminier, et al, Property 175–82 (Aspen 6th ed 2006) (discussing the evolution
of the estates system, which arose out of feudalism and defined estates according to their length
of endurance).
136 Id at 182 (“The development of the fee simple estate is an example of that most striking
phenomenon of English land law, the reification of abstractions, a process of thinking that still
pervades our law.”). While the estate system originally applied only to land, it was subsequently
extended to other tangible and intangible assets.
137 Id at 181–82, 186–90, 225–28.
138 496 NE2d 869 (NY 1986).
139 See id at 871.
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the painting to his son in his will. Doing so, however, would have entailed two distinct costs. First, it would have diminished the enjoyment
of the gift-giver. In Gruen, the date of the gift held emotional significance, as it was the son’s twentieth birthday, not at the much later date
of his father’s death. Second, and more importantly, the recognition of
future interests enhances the efficient management of assets. In permitting creation of a future interest, the law creates the possibility of a
single owner who will obtain greater enjoyment and employ superior
management strategies. In Gruen, for example, the father wanted little
from the painting after his life other than to be sure that his son would
enjoy its value. Once in possession of the future interest, the son could
sell it, mortgage it, diversify his investment holdings around it, and
otherwise deploy it to its greatest advantage, all without disturbing the
140
father’s enjoyment of possession.
It is worth noting that a fictional asset strategy may be available
alongside other strategies, such as that of a fictional owner. For instance, in Gruen, the father could have made himself a trustee for his
son and transferred ownership of the painting to the new trust (a fictional owner). This strategy would have permitted the father to enjoy
the psychological benefit of the timely gift, though it might have com141
promised some of the transferability of the son’s interest.
C.

Forced Aggregation or Disaggregation

The third strategy—forced aggregation and disaggregation—can
be applied both to physical assets (as exemplified by the doctrines of
partition by sale and, most notably, takings by eminent domain) or to
fictional assets (as illustrated by the doctrines of disentailing and the
Rule against Perpetuities). This strategy aims at situations where the
owner is unable to extract the full social value inherent in property
ownership and is therefore likely to maintain the asset in a suboptimal
configuration. The doctrines seek to force the property into the optimal
asset configuration without compromising the drive toward a single
owner, while minimizing the negative impact on owner dominion.
Rules permitting disentailing provide the most obvious, albeit
somewhat obscure, example of this strategy. Fees tail are estates entailing a present right of possession that continues through the direct
blood line. Created by a grant to X and “the heirs of his body,” the fee

140 The father’s desire to avoid testamentary disposition was apparently influenced by his
desire to lower estate tax exposure. See id.
141 A trust would have created a fiduciary duty in the father toward his son regarding the
painting; this would be somewhat more exacting than the duty not to commit waste that was
created by the actual transfer of the future interest.
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tail traditionally transferred possession from generation to generation
142
of X’s descendants in what was essentially a series of life estates.
Grantors would presumably create this estate in order to enhance the
prestige of their families by forcing future generations to retain the
ancestral land, or because the grantors did not trust that future gen143
erations would be as prudent in managing the land as the grantor.
Nonetheless, indulging the grantor’s desires completely would come at
too great a price to asset value. In our terms, the utility enjoyed by the
grantor was outweighed by the disutility to future generations burdened by a poorly configured asset that could not be easily transferred. In response to this problem, lawyers and courts developed the
“common recovery,” allowing future generations to disentail the fee
144
and return it to a fee simple. Ultimately, most jurisdictions abolished
the fee tail, forcing the aggregation of existing fee tails and their at145
tendant future interests into fees simple absolute.
Legal control of aggregation and disaggregation is often necessary for assets that are durable and large. The durability ensures that
the property will likely last over several lifetimes, preventing any one
owner from enjoying its full value. As a consequence of her limited
ability to extract utility from the property, the owner’s incentives will
not necessarily align with the interests of maximum asset value, and
she may initiate various property configurations that seriously diminish asset value, as in the case of the fee tail.
Other times, rules of aggregation and disaggregation provide a
response to changes in external circumstances that affect the optimal
use of assets. For instance, over time, the ideal use of a certain area
may change from farming to railroad to shopping mall. The optimal
parcel size for each of these uses is obviously different. Yet, voluntary
aggregation of assets into the new configuration may be hampered by
high transaction costs, and in particular by strategic barriers. The
state’s power of eminent domain aims at resolving some of these
142 The fee tail was originally codified in the Statute de Donis Conditionalibus, 13 Edw I,
stat I (1285). In England, the successive life estates interpretation of the estate competed with
several other conceptions, such as viewing only the first generation or the first three generations
as equivalent to life estates. See John F. Hart, “A Less Proportion of Idle Proprietors”: Madison,
Property Rights, and the Abolition of Fee Tail, 58 Wash & Lee L Rev 167, 172 (2001).
143 The fee tail could also be useful as a tax-saving device by avoiding estate taxes. See
Dukeminier, et al, Property at 187 (cited in note 135) (noting that the fee tail, though passing
from generation to generation, did not expire until the original tenant in fee tail and all of that
tenant’s descendants were dead).
144 See id at 187–88 (describing common recovery as an expensive legal procedure used to
restore alienability of the land). See also Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier, The Rise of the
Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L Rev 1303, 1320 (2003) (“Later, the common recovery was abolished,
and a tenant in tail was permitted to convey a fee simple by a deed.”).
145 See Dukeminier, et al, Property at 188 (cited in note 135).
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problems by permitting the seizure of a number of parcels despite the
objections of holdouts and reconfiguring them into a new mix of par146
cel sizes and uses.
The example of takings most clearly demonstrates the importance
of analyzing all the property dimensions at once. It is only the eclipse of
the old combinations of single owner and asset that raises the need to
create a new set of single-owner assets through forced transfers. Interestingly, the change in the ideal asset size or configuration may warrant
a transition to smaller, rather than larger, parcel sizes. Such was the case
147
in Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, where legislation employed
the power of eminent domain to force owners to sell fee simple interests to their tenants in order to combat the problem of oligopoly cre148
ated by excessively concentrated land ownership in Hawaii.
D. Limits on Owner-initiated Reconfiguration or Size
A related strategy employed by the law relies not upon the state’s
direct aggregation or disaggregation of property, but, rather, its placing restrictions on the freedom of owners to alter the asset configurations. Such restrictions may be effected either directly, for example, by
zoning rules, or indirectly, through enforcement of nuisance suits or
covenants in common-interest communities. In both cases, the goal of
these restrictions is to preserve certain asset features that maximize
the overall value of the affected assets. Private ordering through contracts maximizes the welfare of the contracting parties but may do so
at the expense of third parties who derive value from the asset. As in
the case of single owners configuring assets suboptimally, this is due to
asset value that cannot be captured by the contracting parties due to
physical limitations or high transaction costs.
For example, absent regulation or other legal restriction, property
owners may choose to build a skyscraper on top of a historic land149
mark without taking full account of the value of the asset as a landmark. Some of the landmark value is long-lasting and will be enjoyed
only by future generations that cannot compensate the owner for pre-

146 For a discussion of the role of eminent domain in countering strategic behavior, see
Posner, 119 Harv L Rev at 93–94 (cited in note 117).
147 467 US 229 (1984) (upholding the constitutionality of the Land Reform Act of 1967,
Haw Rev Stat § 516, which authorized the Hawaii Housing Authority to use eminent domain as a
tool to achieve market dilution).
148 See id at 233 (“[T]he Hawaii Legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967 . . . which
created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts and for transferring ownership of the
condemned fees simple to existing lessees.”).
149 See generally Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York, 438 US 104 (1978).

File: 3 - Bell-Parchomovsky Final 0904

1052

Created on: 9/4/2008 6:55:00 PM

The University of Chicago Law Review

Last Printed: 10/1/2008 5:26:00 PM

[75:1015

150

servation. In addition, some of the asset value is dispersed among the
public at large, as it is available to passersby or even those who simply
151
derive satisfaction from the landmark’s continued existence. Landmark protection legislation, which may take many forms including pro152
hibitory regulatory zoning and incentive-based tax schemes, aims to
prevent physical alteration to assets that harm overall asset value.
Other zoning regulations prevent physical alterations not for protection of asset utility enjoyed by future generations but rather to allocate asset configurations among existing owners. Ideally, such regulations serve as a means of reducing negative externalities produced
by suboptimal asset use at a lower cost than owner-by-owner negotiations. For example, zoning may require a certain amount of green
space to surround housing (through setback and minimum lot size
153
rules). In all these cases, the zoning rule prohibits a particular action
that may enhance an owner’s extraction of utility from the asset at a
particular time but presumably would come at the expense of other
owners’ utility from their nearby land.
While one cannot deny that zoning can become the arena of rent154
seeking decisionmakers, the popularity of zoning even where mobility
is high—as well as the voluntary creation of even more restrictive zoning-like rules in planned developments—suggests that in many situations zoning enhances asset value.
Regulation of asset characteristics is ubiquitous and by no means
limited to realty. Virtually all assets, from cars to bank accounts, are
subject to some form of regulation, restricting the owners’ ability to
reconfigure them. Even fictional assets, such as copyrights, are subject
to some restrictions on reconfiguration. Copyright owners must respect
the moral rights of creators and refrain from changing expressive works.
The purpose of this restriction is to protect the reputation of artists and
150 See generally John Nivala, The Future for Our Past: Preserving Landmark Preservation,
5 NYU Envir L J 83, 113 (1996) (noting that the only compensation the landowner receives for
bearing the cost of preserving tomorrow’s heritage is “the advantage of living and doing business
in a civilized community”).
151 See, for example, William A. Fischel, Lead Us Not into Penn Station: Takings, Historic
Preservation, and Rent Control, 6 Fordham Envir L J 749, 753 (1995) (stating that even an isolated landmark is “a building that provides something that almost all of us would characterize as
a public benefit”).
152 For a discussion of preservation laws, see generally Carol M. Rose, Preservation and
Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 Stan L Rev 473 (1981) (outlining the evolving rationale for modern preservation laws and showing how preservation law
has also become a vehicle for community organization and politics).
153 See Kenneth H. Young, 2 Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 11:01 at 437 (Clark
Boardman Callaghan 4th ed 1996) (“The common zoning regulation requires that the dwellings in
a specific district be constructed on a lot of a minimum size, with minimum frontage and setback.”).
154 See generally William A. Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights
Approach to American Land Use Controls (Johns Hopkins 1985).
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thereby the investment of other owners who might be adversely affected
155
by alterations that are prejudicial to the artist’s reputation.
Outside of the regulatory arena, a number of other property rules
can be seen as barring owner-initiated configurations of assets that are
suboptimal. For example, rules barring certain chronological disaggre156
gations of assets, such as the Rule against Perpetuities, the Rule in
157
158
Shelley’s Case, and a number of other obscure rules, prevent the creation of certain kinds of contingent future interests. Similarly, the elimination of the fee tail not only involved aggregating already-created assets
159
but also prevented future owner-initiated creations of the estate.
The numerus clausus principle that underlies the law of property
may be understood as embodying the same strategy. The principle
limits the ability of private parties to create new property rights, reserving this power exclusively to the legislator. Merrill and Smith justified the principle on the grounds that it economizes on the informa160
tion costs of third parties. Given that property rights avail against the
rest of the world, if individual owners could create new property rights
on a whim, it would force the rest of the world to investigate the nature
of the specific arrangements or risk violating them. The numerus clau161
sus rule primarily restricts the menu of available property rights and
therefore mainly affects the dimension of owners’ domain. Yet the rule
also indirectly restricts owners’ freedom to reconfigure their assets.
E.

Transfer or Elimination of Elements of Dominion

Another strategy employed by policymakers to reconcile the three
competing interests is to authorize the transfer of elements of dominion
155 See generally Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights:
A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J Legal Stud 95 (1997) (arguing that the moral
rights doctrine serves to provide economic benefits not just to the individual artist but also to
owners of the artist’s work and the public at large).
156 The classic formulation of the rule is John Chipman Gray’s: “No interest is good unless it
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest.” John C. Gray, The Rule against Perpetuities § 201 at 191 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1942).
157 The Rule in Shelley’s Case states “that if (1) one instrument (2) creates a life estate in
land in A, and (3) purports to create a remainder in persons described as A’s heirs (or the heirs
of A’s body), and (4) the life estate and remainder are both legal or both equitable, the remainder becomes a remainder in fee simple (or fee tail) in A.” Dukeminier, et al, Property at 243
(cited in note 135).
158 Other rules include the rule of the destructibility of contingent remainders and the
doctrine of worthier title. See id at 241–44.
159 See notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
160 See Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 8 (cited in note 71) (“The existence of unusual
property rights increases the cost of processing information about all property rights. . . . Standardization of property rights reduces these measurement costs.”).
161 See id at 40 (describing how numerus clausus, though strongly restrictive, is also permissive and therefore tends toward the optimal level of standardization).
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to others or, in extreme cases, to transfer directly or eliminate dominion elements altogether. This strategy limits property rights by limiting
the dominion of the owner without forcing the addition of others to
the ownership structure and without reducing the scope of the owned
asset. As such, the strategy necessarily compromises the Blackstonian
ideal, but it does so in order to preserve interests not protected by the
ordinary structure of property law.
This strategy often comes into play where assets consistently produce significant positive externalities making them valuable to others,
while dispersing the benefits so as to preclude cost-effective bargaining between the owners and individual beneficiaries of the positive
externalities. The strategy seeks to preserve the positive externalities
for others over time by creating tools that lock in value for beneficiaries despite possible changes in ownership.
Interestingly, the strategy is most valuable at opposite extremes
of benefit dispersal. Where there is only a single beneficiary, individualized bargaining might be foiled by strategic difficulties seen in a bi162
lateral monopoly. Conversely, where the beneficiary is a large and
dispersed public, bargaining may be precluded by the fact that no individual beneficiary enjoys enough benefit to warrant transacting with
the owner. Either way, the strategy offers a way to anchor such bargains
as may be struck into property interests that bind successors in interest.
Transfer of elements of an owner’s dominion to others is often
carried out via formalization of various nonpossessory interests in
assets. A familiar example is the formalization of conservation easements. Jurisdictions that recognize conservation easements permit
landowners to grant third parties, typically an environmental organization, a nonpossessory interest in the land in exchange for some tax
163
benefits. The mechanism of conservation easements is designed to
permit beneficiaries to bar socially undesirable uses of private land.
By granting the easement, the owner restricts her dominion over her
property, committing not to harm certain socially valuable characteristics of the property. The recipient of the easement has no possessory
rights and instead takes only a right to a particular use of the land and

162 See generally Ian M. Dobbs and Martyn B. Hill, Pricing Solutions to the Bilateral Monopoly Problem under Uncertainty, 60 S Econ J 479 (1993) (deriving a nonuniform price solution
to the bilateral monopoly problem in response to the suboptimal performance of uniform pricing).
163 See generally Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in Julie A. Gustanski and Roderick H. Squires, eds, Protecting the Land: Conservation
Easements Past, Present, and Future 26 (Island 2000) (presenting a comparative analysis of the
basic elements of conservation easements among different states).
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164

the right to bar the owner’s interference therewith. Importantly, because the easement is a property right and not merely a contractual
arrangement, it continues with the land and does not have to be rebargained with every new owner.
The conveyance of elements of an owner’s dominion to others is
also a viable means of preempting negative externalities. Indeed, all
servitudes—easements, covenants, equitable servitudes, profits, and
165
others—are understood in this light. Covenants, for example, are
binding agreements founded in a property relationship that “run with
the land” instead of dissipating with the departure of the original cove166
nantors. Covenants do not create new titleholders or owners of any of
the concerned assets. Rather, they impose small restrictions on owner
dominion in order to bestow nonpossessory rights on the covenantee.
Sometimes, lawmakers deem it necessary to go beyond authorizing the transfer of elements of dominion to directly regulating or eliminating certain dominion elements. This result is achieved by regulation
or operation of law rather than by private bargain. Regulatory restrictions on owners’ dominion can be seen in use restrictions in zoning ordinances as well as various environmental and conservation laws. Zoning regulations may prevent some owner uses such as the opening of
167
gas stations in residential developments or the operation of industrial
168
plants too close to neighboring homes. Statutes like the Clean Air
169
170
171
Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act prevent, among other things, property owners from performing certain acts
on their property that pollute or endanger certain animal and plant species, and similarly inhabit the boundary between the two strategies.
The law of waste—as applied between concurrent owners—is another example. Essentially, the doctrine grants the owner out of possession the power to prevent certain uses of the asset that may be

164 See id at 27 (noting that the definition of a conservation easement varies across states
and is defined by states who have adopted the Uniform Conservation Easement Act as a “nonpossessory interest . . . in real property”).
165 See Dukeminier, et al, Property at 667–71 (cited in note 135).
166 Id at 740–44.
167 See generally, for example, Sanborn v McLean, 206 NW 496 (Mich 1925) (enjoining the
building of a gas station on land subject to a longstanding reciprocal negative easement prohibiting non-residential buildings).
168 See generally, for example, Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co, Inc, 257 NE2d 870, 873 (NY
1970).
169 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act (“Clean Air Act”), Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat
1676 (1970), codified as amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq (2000).
170 Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act (“Clean Water Act”), Pub L No 92500, 86 Stat 816 (1972), codified as amended at 33 USC § 1251 et seq (2000 & Supp 2004).
171 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884, codified as amended at
16 USC § 1531 et seq (2000).
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172

deleterious to her interest. The law of waste effectively forces the
owner in possession to take account of other concurrent owners’ interests and refrain from acting in ways that maximize her payoffs at
the expense of theirs. Without the law of waste, concurrent owners
would likely be forced to maintain a physical presence on the property
in order to monitor each other’s uses. Hence, the formalization of the
law of waste makes it possible to use land more efficiently by entrusting possession to single owners and lowering monitoring costs for
owners out of possession.
F.

Differential Acquisition Rules

A final strategy polices the degree and timing of privatization of
assets. Thus, some resources are subject to a rule of capture, encouraging rapid assimilation into the domain of private property, while others are subject to rules such as reasonable use or public trust that prevent full transition to private property.
The rule of capture awards ownership of physical objects to the
173
first person to reduce the items to possession. The classic form of the
174
rule is found in Pierson v Post, which resolved a dispute between two
hunters who claimed the same fox. The court ruled that foxes, as wild
animals, were subject to seizure and the establishment of private property rights upon capture, and that foxes hunted on public lands were
captured and transformed into private property upon “occupation,”
175
that is, physical seizure of the animals. The rule of capture has been
applied in a number of other situations in which courts sought to establish how private property rights are established in “fugitive re176
sources.” In addition, property law contains many parallels to the
rule of capture in which ownership goes to the first person to seize the
asset and reduce it to possession. For example, the rule of discovery in

172 See generally Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation, 91 Cornell L Rev 653, 658 (2006).
173 See the discussion in Smith, 90 Va L Rev at 1030–32 (cited in note 110).
174 3 Cai R 175 (NY Sup Ct 1805).
175 See id at 175.
176 See the discussion in Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the
Law, 38 J L & Econ 393, 422–30 (1995):

First possession rules are the dominant method of initially establishing property rights. Such
rules grant a legitimate ownership claim to the party that gains control before other potential claimants. They have been applied widely in both common and statute law, in such varied settings as abandoned property, adverse possession, bona fide purchasing, the electromagnetic spectrum, emissions rights, fisheries and wildlife, groundwater, hardrock minerals,
intellectual property, oil and gas, land, nonbankruptcy debt collection, satellite orbits, spoils
of war, treasure trove, and water rights.
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land awards ownership to the first “discoverer” of unowned realty.
Similarly, the law awards ownership of abandoned property to the first
178
person to take true possession of the item.
Yet, rules of capture are not universal. In many circumstances, the
law prevents rapid assimilation of assets into private property, and
instead limits the ability of potential owners to transform unowned
assets into private property. For example, the various rules for establishing private property rights over unowned water generally forbid
ownership to the first person to establish possession over any given
waters. The English “natural flow” rule for surface waters forbids water appropriation by upstream riparian landowners in any way that
impairs the water’s “natural flow” unless the appropriation enjoys the
179
assent of all downstream owners. The American “reasonable use”
rule permits appropriation without such assent, but only to the extent of
180
a reasonable riparian use for the upstream land. A competing American rule—the “Colorado” rule or “prior appropriation” rule—
privileges the first beneficial appropriation over other would-be ap181
propriators; this rule too, while bearing some resemblance to first
possession doctrines, ultimately leaves some waters outside the private
182
property system.
First appropriation of water is problematic given the general geographic location and movement of water. Stable patterns of consumption would not be possible under a first appropriation rule, as no use
would be entitled to legal protection until potential users reached contractual agreements with all potential rival claimants. Absent such
agreements, only waters actually reduced to possession would be owned.
As a result, high transaction costs would bar efficient investments. Why
177 One infamous application of this rule can be found in M’Intosh, 21 US at 595–96, 604–05,
which ruled that Native Americans did not have true ownership of lands in the Americas and
that the European nations could therefore establish ownership through “discovery.”
178 See, for example, Eads v Brazelton, 22 Ark 499, 499 (1861) (ruling that ownership over
an abandoned shipwreck could be established by “occupation”—that is, actual salvage operations and not mere discovery of the wreck’s location—and that failure to reduce the wreck to
possession defeated a claim of ownership).
179 See T.E. Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 Mo L Rev 60,
101–02 (1963) (discussing the English case of Wright v Howard, 57 Eng Rep 76 (Ch 1823), which
introduced the “natural flow” theory, affirming the principle that each proprietor has equal rights to
water usage and therefore no proprietor can use her right to the prejudice of any other).
180 See Evans v Merriweather, 4 Ill 492, 494 (1842) (“There may be, and there must be, of
that which is common to all, a reasonable use. The true test of the principle and extent of the use
is, whether it is to the injury of the other proprietors or not.”).
181 See, for example, Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Co, 6 Colo 443, 446 (1882).
182 A nonbeneficial use, for example, grants no appropriative rights; it is the style of appropriation rather than the actual capture that grants the rights. Thus, someone might draw from
unclaimed waters but be forbidden to exercise property rights over them because they fall within
the scope of the privileged appropriation.
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invest in a water pump if only water actually pumped is protected and
future upstream diversions cannot be prevented?
Additionally, excessively rapid assimilation of some natural resources could lead to a tragedy of the commons, involving overappropriation and wasteful use. This is due to the taker’s ability to internalize the stream of benefits from a resource once it is reduced to property, while paying only the direct cost of appropriation and a miniscule
share of the loss to society as a result of the resource being removed
from the commons and closed to others’ use. Only where transaction
costs are sufficiently low (as in, for example, a small community with
highly effective social norms) can the tragedy be avoided as every
taker is forced or convinced (through side payments) to internalize a
183
greater share of the societal cost.
Holding natural resources like water outside the ordinary appropriation rules keeps the Blackstonian property system away from a
resource to which it is ill-suited but does so without changing the
Blackstonian nature of property. Thus, once water is appropriated,
under whatever rule, it is owned under precisely the same rule as any
other property. This keeps water (once divided under special rules of
appropriation) within standard asset-owner-dominion configurations.
At the same time, the appropriation rules encourage appropriate investments and discourage tragedies of the commons.
Other natural resources have also been placed outside the ordinary capture rule. While oil and gas have been viewed as “fugitive resources” and therefore logically analogous to wild animals subject to
the capture rule, many states have adopted a different course. Modern
rules prevent free and unlimited appropriation, and instead force potential claimants into common pools or restrict them to variations of reason184
able use. Arrangements of the latter type serve, like water rules, to preserve standard Blackstonian property configurations for the resource
once it is appropriated, but slow appropriation to take account of the size
of the pool and the associated difficulties with free appropriation.
Use of differential appropriation rules allows policymakers to
distinguish between asset characteristics that are not a good fit for
private property rights subject to other nonprivate property regimes,
while retaining some degree of property treatment where appropriate.
183 See generally Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action (Cambridge 1990) (criticizing assumptions underlying proposed solutions to
the tragedy of the commons and exploring an alternative solution in which users self-organize
and govern themselves in the long-term management of the common resources).
184 See generally Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 Harv L Rev 1155
(1952) (discussing regulatory efforts in the oil and gas industry to prevent waste and improve
recovery through prorationing, well-spacing, or compulsory pooling and unitization).
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Asset characteristics that do not fit well with private property rights
may be subjected to other nonprivate property regimes. Property
treatment may be retained, nonetheless, where appropriate for other
asset characteristics. Rather than forcing all assets into the Blackstonian mold of a single owner, this strategy keeps certain assets out of
the private property system and under common or public ownership
until it makes economic sense to introduce private property rights in
them or in certain aspects of them.
IV. THREE-DIMENSIONAL SOLUTIONS FOR PROPERTY PROBLEMS
In this Part, we present some normative implications of our threedimensional property analysis. Specifically, we show how many property dilemmas that have traditionally been resolved by one of the six
strategies we outlined in the previous Part are actually amenable to
resolution by more than one strategy. In addition, we show that some
dilemmas not previously considered as amenable to resolution may be
resolved by use of one or more of the six strategies. Finally, we look at
some problems that have been created in defining property rights
without due heed to a three-dimensional analysis and show how they
may be resolved by using one or more of our six strategies.
A. Tribal Land
As discussed earlier, anticommons—excessive fragmentation of
ownership shares among owners—characteristically plague some prop185
erty forms. One of the most prominent examples of an anticommons
is provided by the land regime in Native American reservations. In a
well-intentioned but misguided attempt to protect communal Native
American lands in the late nineteenth century, Congress provided for
the allocation of reservation lands among Native American house186
holds, with provisos severely limiting alienation of the parcels. Over
the years, the lands became ever more divided among heirs and the
parcels became increasingly fragmented to the point where some land
interests produced a lease income of as little as a tiny fraction of one
187
cent per month and much of the land lay fallow. In 1983, Congress
185

See Part II.A.
See General Allotment Act, ch 119, 24 Stat 388 (1887), codified in various sections of
title 25, repealed by the Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000 § 106(a), Pub L No
106-462, 114 Stat 2007, codified in various sections of title 25. See also Act of March 2, 1889, ch
405, 25 Stat 888 (authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation into
separate reservations and the allotment of specific tracts of reservation land to individual Indians, conditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the adult male Sioux).
187 Hodel v Irving, 481 US 704, 708 (1987) (quoting legislative history on the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934).
186
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passed the Indian Land Consolidation Act, which escheated small portions of highly fractionated parcels to the tribe upon death of the
188
owner. However, in Hodel v Irving, the Supreme Court ruled that
189
the escheat worked an unconstitutional uncompensated taking. As
Heller noted in criticizing the case, the result was that many Native
190
American lands remained in an anticommons.
A three-dimensional analysis highlights the possibility of other
strategies for combating anticommons. Reducing the number of owners by eliminating the interests of holders of small portions of highly
fractional parcels is not the only possible solution to the challenge of
excessive fragmentation, nor is it necessarily the best one. Indeed,
even after eliminating the claims of the smallest interest holders, the
land would remain divided among multiple owners (albeit with somewhat greater interests). Hence, while clearing title of the smallest
owners’ claims would likely prevent further deterioration into anticommons, it would not likely improve the alienability of the land or
the cost of managing it to a significant extent.
Our approach highlights the possibility of adjustments along the
owner or dominion axes and thereby brings to light several strategies
that could outperform the solution of forced forfeiture. For instance,
policymakers could address the problem of excessive fragmentation of
interests in tribal land by appointing a single fictional owner in the
land, such as a tribal cooperative, with tribal member-owners exchanging their undivided fractional interests in the land for shares in the
cooperative. This solution respects all existing claims to the property
while reducing the cost of managing the land. The owners would
commute their veto powers for voting rights, and decisions about the
use of the land would be made by the majority of the members.
Alternatively, policymakers might consider making the land freely alienable and use the strategy of formalizing limited nonpossessory
tribal rights to protect traditional land uses. This approach would allow tribe members to transfer their land to nonmembers subject to a
servitude that would run with the land and ensure that future owners
do not use it in ways prejudicial to the tribal heritage. This would allow owners to escape the trap of passing along small, unusable shares
by selling them to a buyer with a superior use. At the same time, the
188

481 US 704 (1987).
See id at 716–18. See also Babbitt v Youpee, 519 US 234, 244 (1997) (ruling that Congress’s effort to rehabilitate the Act by allowing a narrow class of individuals to receive fractional interests did not cure the fatal flaw ruled unconstitutional in Irving).
190 See Heller, 108 Yale L J at 1217 (cited in note 11) (attacking the Hodel and Babbitt
decisions rejecting private antifragmentation strategies as further perpetuating the tragedy of the
anticommons).
189
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nonpossessory interests retained by the tribe members would enable
them to seek injunctive relief against future owners whose uses run
afoul of tribal traditions.
B.

Conservation Commons

The strategy of formalizing nonpossessory interests could improve the management of natural resources. A three-dimensional approach demonstrates the possibility of creating useful new tools for
achieving conservation of parks and open space.
Parks generally do not fit well into private property regimes.
Purely private parks are likely to be undersupplied as spillover benefits to neighbors are extensive and transaction costs are high. Thus,
many areas that would be socially optimal for use as parks will be
used in some other manner that provides a higher return for the private owner, even though the private use is inferior from a social wel191
fare point of view. Ordinary commons management of parks and
open spaces is also problematic. Turning parks into public commons
192
raises the specter of overexploitation. Without effective governance
and enforcement mechanisms, common property regimes make it possible for members of the owners’ group to take full advantage of the
resources without bearing the full cost of their actions.
Generally, the real world solution for the failings of common and
private property in this context is found along the ownership axis.
Specifically, authorities usually keep parks and open space under government ownership. Unfortunately, this solution raises a few problems
of its own. First, government actors often mismanage conservation
properties. Government actors are imperfect agents of the public will,
and they may find it advantageous to trade away the benefits of their
power for personal gain. Thus, for example, they may collaborate with
private developers to dispose of government property at submarket
prices and encourage inefficient development on conservation prop193
erty. Additionally, decisionmakers may fall prey to fiscal illusion that
leads them to fail to take account of public benefits or costs that do

191 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Anti-property, 102 Mich
L Rev 1, 2 (2003) (“Government actors often mismanage conservation properties, collaborating
with private developers to dispose of government property at submarket prices and encouraging
inefficient development on conservation property.”).
192 See Hardin, 162 Science at 1244 (cited in note 96).
193 Bell and Parchomovsky, 102 Mich L Rev at 2 (cited in note 191). To give one example,
the federal Bureau of Land Management came under fire in a recent congressional report for its
sale of seventy acres of Nevada land to a private developer for $763,000; the developer sold the
land the next day for $4.6 million. See Joel Brinkley, A U.S. Agency Is Accused of Collusion in
Land Deals, NY Times A16 (Oct 12, 2002).
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194

not appear directly in the government budget. Together, these factors lead to a significant likelihood that conservation properties will
be transferred to suboptimal development interests even when owned
195
by the government.
A possible remedy to the problem of government mismanagement of conservation properties is to divide the asset or dominion,
rather than selecting a different single owner. As we have suggested
elsewhere, lawmakers could provide for formalized nonpossessory
rights—specifically, negative easements—in neighboring property
196
owners. Formalizing the neighbors’ interests into formal negative
easements would introduce a new element into conservation of the
197
threatened land: a network of antidevelopment rights. The creation
of a network of nonpossessory rights in neighboring property owners
would not give them any special rights to use or possess conservation
properties. Yet, it would give them veto power over the development
of conservation properties, enabling them to seek legal remedy against
development plans that did not get their blessing. Furthermore, the
resulting network of negative easements in the hands of the neighbors
could produce a regime in which it is practically impossible for unwanted development to threaten conservation of the defended property. Developers who wish to develop the land would need to secure
consent from all easement holders in a process that is notoriously susceptible to holdout problems and strategic bargaining.
C.

Access to Coastal Lands

Property rights in beaches present a particularly nettlesome problem in many states. Generally, state law preserves the wet sand area
(the strip of sand demarcated by the ebb and the flow of the tides) as
public property while recognizing private property rights in the dry
198
sand area. In many beaches, the general public cannot access the wet
sands without crossing over private dry sands. States have resorted to
various tactics in order to create or preserve access to the wet sands
beaches. Courts in New Jersey invoked the public trust doctrine as
grounds for creating easements by necessity over private beach proper-

194

Bell and Parchomovsky, 102 Mich L Rev at 17 (cited in note 191).
For examples, see id at 30–31 (listing four recent sales of undeveloped public lands in which
conservation interests were systematically disadvantaged by the political decisionmaking process).
196 See id at 31–37 (proposing an “antiproperty easement” that vests in each property owner the right to veto any development in nearby green space).
197 Previously we have labeled those rights “antiproperty rights.” See id at 5.
198 See Rose, 53 U Chi L Rev at 713 (cited in note 86). Some states, most notably California,
have extended the rights of the public “from the tidelands to the dry sand areas landward of the
high-tide mark.” Id at 713–14.
195
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199

ties for the benefit of the public. Specifically, the courts reasoned that
the state’s duty under the public trust doctrine to preserve public beach
access implied the existence of public easements over private lands as
necessary to ensure access. Courts in California and Texas chose to rely
on theories of prescriptive easements or implied dedication to secure
200
access and use rights for the public. Finally, courts in Oregon, Florida,
201
and Hawaii turned to a theory of custom to reach the same result.
The various approaches taken by the courts have one thing in
common: they all focus on the dominion dimension. In all cases, courts
recognized public access rights by narrowing the exclusion rights of
beachfront property owners. Specifically, the courts interpreted the
bundle of rights of beachfront owners as not including the right to
exclude members of the general public seeking to reach the beach.
A different solution to the problem of public access to beaches becomes apparent once the problem is analyzed along the asset dimension. An asset-oriented analysis suggests that the problem of public access to beaches arises due to a suboptimal configuration of beachfront
properties. The decision to create contiguous strips of private parcels
effectively blocked the public from reaching the beach without trespassing on private property. An optimal configuration of the wet sands
beach asset would necessarily include a means of access. From an assetoriented perspective, it becomes apparent that the challenge of access
to beaches presents a natural case for forced reconfiguration.
A different configuration of private lots interspersed with government lots (or narrow government strips) could be a better solution
to the problem. Initially, such a configuration could have been achieved
if the government retained title in certain beachfront lots and granted
the public a right of access across them. Today, such a configuration
can be accomplished via government exercises of its eminent domain
199 See generally, for example, Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Association, 471 A2d 355
(NJ 1984) (finding that the public must be given both access to and use of the foreshore as well
as privately owned dry sand areas “as reasonably necessary”).
200 See generally, for example, Gion v City of Santa Cruz, 465 P2d 50 (Cal 1970) (superseded by statute) (holding that an implied dedication of property rights to the public arose when
the public has used the land for more than five years without permission or objection from previous owners); Seaway Co v Attorney General of Texas, 375 SW2d 923 (Tex Civ App 1964) (affirming the jury’s finding of an implied dedication of land to public use and of an easement by
prescription over land that had been continuously and adversely used for over ten years).
201 See generally, for example, Thornton v Hay, 462 P2d 671 (Or 1969) (ruling that the public’s use of the dry sand areas of the beach met all the elements of the custom doctrine: ancient,
exercised without interruption, peaceable, reasonable, certain, obligatory, and not repugnant or
inconsistent with any other law or custom); City of Daytona Beach v Tona-Rama, Inc, 294 S2d 73
(Fla 1974) (subscribing to the customary rights doctrine but declining to find an easement by
prescription because the public’s use of the property was in furtherance of, not against, the interests of the private landowner); County of Hawaii v Sotomura, 517 P2d 57 (Hawaii 1973) (recognizing that the public’s long-standing use of the beach had ripened to a customary right).
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power. Although this solution would initially impose a cost on the
government, as it would require compensating aggrieved property
owners, it might represent a long-term improvement for all parties
involved. Private property owners would fare better under the proposed solution because those property owners whose property will be
taken would receive compensation. The public would benefit from
clearer and more convenient access to the beach. The government
may be better off in the long run because there might be fewer conflicts between owners of beachfront properties.
D. Land Assembly
Provision of infrastructure and public goods often requires the
government to engage in land assembly. Whenever this need arises,
there is a natural tendency to think about eminent domain. After all, it
is the accepted lore among legal scholars that land assembly is the paradigmatic situation in which the government ought to exercise its tak202
ings power. Consider, for example, a plan to run a railway through a
mountain valley. Without eminent domain, a single holdout can stop the
project. Eminent domain allows the government to get around the high
transaction costs and holdouts inherent in this situation.
Our three-dimensional analysis expands on the conventional
analysis in two important respects. First, it complements the conventional analysis by more precisely characterizing the assets that ought
to be taken by eminent domain. Our contribution here is primarily
descriptive; we summarize the purpose of some eminent domain doctrines and suggest how they may be best implemented. Second, our
analysis challenges the conventional analysis by proposing alternative
ways to carry out large-scale projects without resorting to eminent
domain. We discuss these matters in order.
Many commentators have noted that the construction of railroads
and highways by the government necessitates exercises of eminent domain. Little attention, if any, has been paid to the important question of
how much of the involved assets the government should take. From the
government standpoint, the answer is clear. Since the government must
pay compensation for the value of the taken property, it has an incentive to take as little as possible. Thus, in order to minimize compensation payments, the government is likely to prefer to take an easement
203
over taking title to part of the tract when possible. Likewise, when the
202 See, for example, Posner, 119 Harv L Rev at 94 (cited in note 117) (discussing the need
to assemble a large tract of land for the city’s redevelopment plan as a possible impetus for the
exercise of eminent domain in Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469 (2005)).
203 See, for example, Preseault v United States, 100 F3d 1525, 1532 (Fed Cir 1996).
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government decides to take title, it will be inclined to take title to part
204
of a tract and not condemn the tract as a whole.
While dominion-oriented perspectives may favor such a “minimalist” approach, as it represents the smallest possible incursion on the
rights of owners, an asset-oriented perspective strongly militates against
it. To illustrate, let us return to the railway example. In the nineteenth
century, the government and private railroad companies acquired multiple easements over private properties in order to run railways through
them. These were no ordinary easements. Rather, they were high-impact,
durable easements that completely prevented the titleholder from
205
using the part of her property burdened by the right-of-way. Effectively, the taking of the easement deprived the owner of virtually the
entire value of the affected part. Such takings, in other words, had the
same effect as title transfers of a slice of the parcel. However, by taking an easement rather than full title to the slice, such takings led to
distorted configurations of both the title and the easement. As the
years passed, the economics of the railroad business changed dramatically, leading to many lines becoming uneconomical. Yet, the existence
of the easements encouraged the companies to maintain lines in suboptimal situations, as abandonment of the line would lead to abandonment of the realty. Only where the social loss exceeded substantial
transaction costs would it be worthwhile for railroads to abandon the
easement in exchange for an agreed-upon compensation.
Additionally, even if the government were to take title over a
portion of the parcel, running a railway through the middle of a tract
could, in some cases, render the remainder virtually valueless. Accordingly, in such cases, it is important for authorities to apply the strategy
of forced aggregation and compel the government to take title to the
whole lot. This suggestion is in marked contrast with the general practice of taking no more of an interest than narrowly necessary to ac206
complish the public purpose of the taking.
The second point we wish to make is that land assembly does not
necessarily call for the use of eminent domain. Indeed, several of the
204

Consider Ink v City of Canton, 212 NE2d 574, 579 (Ohio 1965).
Indeed, in Preseault, the government advanced the argument that “the general federal
legislation providing for the Government’s control over interstate railroad operations as enacted
and amended over the years had the effect of redefining the private property rights of these
owners, leaving them without a compensable interest in the land.” 100 F3d at 1533.
206 See Hill v Western Vermont Railroad Co, 32 Vt 68, 76 (1859):
205

In either mode of appropriating land for the purposes of the company, . . . there is this implied limitation upon the power [of eminent domain], that the company will take only so
much land or estate therein as is necessary for their public purposes. It does not seem to us
to make much difference in regard to either the quantity or the estate, whether the price is
fixed by the commissioners or by the parties.
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strategies we discuss in Part III can be used instead of takings. Assume, for example, that the government needs to assemble a sufficiently large parcel for a parking lot. The standard solution is to replace the multiple private owners of the relevant lots with a single government owner through the use of eminent domain. Importantly, the
same result can be accomplished by alternative strategies as well. One
such strategy is the creation of a fictional owner. For example, the government can force the relevant private owners to set up a corporation
or a partnership and then transfer their lots to it in exchange for shares.
A somewhat similar approach was taken by Michigan in the oil and gas
industry. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality adopted
a procedure to mandate compulsory pooling “whenever an owner desires to develop his or her mineral rights, but cannot do so because the
207
owner’s tract is smaller than the established drilling unit.” Amnon
Lehavi and Amir Licht proposed an interesting variation on this strategy in which land assembly for large-scale, for-profit development projects would be permitted only by means of a special-purpose development corporation, which would, in turn, have to offer condemnees the
208
option of compensation in corporate shares instead of cash.
As many commentators have noted, the strategy of imposing limitations on owners’ ability to reconfigure their assets can also lead to
outcomes that are just as valuable as land assembly for some purposes.
An industrial park, for example, can be created by zoning changes
rather than by land assembly through eminent domain. As part of its
police power, the government can exert significant control over the
development and use of property. The government can rezone properties to ensure that they would be put to the desired use, or employ
more indirect incentives to induce property owners to carry out the
government’s will. Naturally, it is possible to combine strategies in
appropriate cases.
E.

Superfund

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
209
and Liability Act (CERCLA or “Superfund”) is one of the most justly maligned pieces of environmental legislation ever adopted by Con207 James R. Neal, Compulsory Pooling Promotes Conservation of Michigan’s Oil and Gas
Natural Resources, 78 Mich Bar J 158, 161 (1999) (defending Michigan’s compulsory pooling
procedure as promoting a reasonable balance between conservation and development interests).
208 See Amnon Lehavi and Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 Colum L Rev 1704,
1732 (2007).
209 Pub L No 96-510, 94 Stat 2767 (1980), codified as amended at 42 USC § 9601 et seq
(2000) (creating a tax on the chemical and petroleum industries and providing broad federal
authority to respond to the release or threatened release of hazardous waste).
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gress. CERCLA was intended to clean up polluted land and prevent
further contamination. In part, it did this by establishing guidelines for
hazardous waste disposal, identifying “brownfields” (polluted par210
cels), creating a Superfund to pay for cleanup, and identifying a large
class of jointly and severally liable “potential responsible parties” who
would have to contribute to the cost of cleanup. The actual results of
the legislation have been underwhelming. Most brownfields remain
polluted more than twenty-five years after the establishment of Super211
fund. The Act’s assumed dichotomy of polluted and clean lands often
requires excessive cleanup, while the multiplicity of liable parties and
the enormous liability costs encourage excessive litigation.
In a property rights analysis, CERCLA’s effect is to force the
212
bundling of all brownfields with liability. Any potential purchaser of
a polluted land parcel must automatically accept exposure to joint and
several liability under CERCLA. This asset configuration can hardly
be calculated to place brownfields under their most beneficial use.
Survey data and scholarly literature emphasize that concern for future
213
liability is a primary reason for brownfields remaining undeveloped.
And, indeed, there is little reason to suspect that an optimal developer
of a brownfield will also be the optimal insurer of other parties’
CERCLA obligations. The result is a poorly configured asset compris214
ing land plus liability that is suboptimally exploited.
A three-dimensional perspective offers a number of possibilities
for redressing this problem. The most straightforward means lie in the
asset dimension. If owners of Superfund sites were able to sell the
brownfields without the attached liability, the pool of potential users
would expand without in any way diminishing the pool of liable parties since all parties liable prior to the sale would maintain their status.
Under current administrative practice, the EPA and states sometimes

210 Subject to a handful of exceptions, CERCLA defines a brownfield as “real property, the
expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential
presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.” 42 USC § 9601(39)(A).
211 For general information about Superfund, see EPA, CERCLA Overview (July 17, 2007),
online at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm (visited June 8, 2008).
212 See for example, Fenton D. Strickland, Note, Brownfield Remediated? How the Bona Fide
Prospective Purchaser Exemption from CERCLA Liability and the Windfall Lien Inhibit Brownfield Redevelopment, 38 Ind L Rev 789, 789 (2005) (noting that many brownfields lay deserted and
undeveloped because developers fear the risk of liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA).
213 See generally Anna Alberini, et al, The Role of Liability, Regulation, and Economic
Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Development: Evidence from Survey of Developers, 35
Regional Sci and Urban Econ 327 (2005).
214 See generally Howard F. Chang and Hilary Sigman, The Effect of Joint and Several
Liability under Superfund on Brownfields, 27 Intl Rev L & Econ 363 (2007) (using a model of
joint and several liability to show how liability risks from Superfund discourage the purchase of
brownfields and emphasizing the effects arising from the potential buildup of defendants).
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attempt to imitate this asset division by issuing “prospective purchaser
agreements” assuring would-be purchasers that the EPA will not im215
pose additional CERCLA responsibilities. Formalization of the asset
division could enhance the marketability of brownfields.
Less obviously, CERCLA could offer possibilities for immunity
from liability while obtaining more limited rights. For example,
CERCLA could offer greater immunity for many kinds of service
providers and developers, permitting owners to subcontract for development without expanding the liability pool. This would permit greater owner calibration of dominion and asset configuration in order to
maximize the efficiency of brownfield use.
F.

Intellectual Property

We illustrate the usefulness of the two final strategies—fictional
assets and differential acquisition rules. Intellectual property embodies an attempt to strike a balance between society’s desire to ensure
adequate provision of intellectual goods and its interest in guaranteeing wide access to, and use of, the works once they have been produced. Intellectual property law strives to achieve this delicate balance
by granting property protection to creators on the one hand, while imposing limits on the duration and scope of the rights on the other. Naturally, intellectual property law is not static. Rather, as we discussed
in Part III.B, it is subject to constant adjustments and refinements.
Recently, an increasing number of commentators have cautioned
that in the last several decades intellectual property owners managed
to augment their protection at the expense of the public. The natural
reaction of intellectual property theorists was to propose narrowing
the rights of intellectual property owners (and, correspondingly, ex216
panding those of the public). For the most part, these proposals fall
under the category of formalization of nonpossessory property inter217
ests. For example, expansion of fair use rights does not seek to strip
215 See generally id. See also Robert V. Percival, et al, Environmental Regulation: Law,
Science, and Policy 269 (Aspen 4th ed 2003) (describing the EPA’s announcement in 1995 to
promote the use of “comfort letters” for owners worried about continued CERCLA liability and,
similarly, “prospective purchaser agreements” to assure potential buyers worried about future
CERCLA liability); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, et al, Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and
Society 1018 (Aspen 3d ed 2004).
216 See, for example, Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm
for Copyright in a Digital World, 79 Or L Rev 647, 647–48 (2000) (noting the expansion of copyright holders’ rights at the expense of the public and seeking to arrest this trend by implementing
principles of public trust to information).
217 For proposals of this kind, see, for example, Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin Goldman,
Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va L Rev 1483, 1488 (2007) (proposing to expand fair use by formalizing
fair use harbors that would supplement the current equitable analysis).
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the asset away from the copyright holder but rather to reduce the
holders’ rights of exclusion.
Assuming that the critics are correct about the deleterious expansion of intellectual property rights, our analysis yields two interesting alternatives. Instead of scaling back protection, lawmakers can: (1) change
the definition of the protected asset; and/or (2) make it more difficult
to acquire protection by changing the prerequisites for acquiring property rights in intellectual goods. The first strategy is especially useful in
the context of intellectual property. Intellectual goods are essentially
fictional assets. For this reason, policymakers can redefine them with
relative ease. Unlike a fox or other tangible assets, a copyright or a
patent can be defined in many different ways. Current law illustrates
this point. Copyright law affords protection to expression but not to
the idea underlying it. Patent law, by contrast, does afford protection
to the idea underlying an invention. Accordingly, if one believes that
patent protection stifles competition in the product market, a possible
solution may be to redefine the protected asset by excluding ideas
from the scope of patent grants. A similar strategy may be applied to
copyrights. For example, current copyright law protects, among many
other works, compilations of preexisting public domain materials. Per
our suggestion, policymakers could easily exclude such works from the
definition of copyrightable subject matter.
The second strategy takes a different tack. Indeed, there are already many crucial differences in the acquisition rules pertaining to
different kinds of intellectual property. Patent protection can be acquired only by securing approval from the Patent and Trademark Office after a fairly exacting review. Trademark law posts a much lower
barrier: the use of a mark in commerce. Finally, copyright posts the
lowest barrier of all: protection springs into existence when original
expression is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. More importantly, the rules of acquisition change over time. For example, until the
218
passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, publication—not fixation—
triggered copyright protection and unpublished works received no protection. International pressure prompted the US to drop the publication requirement and to settle for the much lower bar of fixation. In
principle, however, the process is reversible. For example, if policymakers believe we have too many copyrights, they can address the
problem by legislating stricter acquisition standards. For instance, in
the context of copyright law, it is possible to substitute the lax originality standard for a much stricter “considerable creativity” requirement.
Similarly, in the context of patent law, it is possible to replace the non218

Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, codified as amended at 17 USC § 101 et seq (2000).
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obviousness standard—which requires an invention to be nontrivial to
a person skilled in the relevant art—with the more stringent “inventive step” standard that is employed in Europe. Of course, the two
strategies are not mutually exclusive and may easily be combined.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we demonstrated the importance of adopting a
three-dimensional approach to property law and policy. This approach
maintains that every property determination can be analyzed along
the dimensions of number of owners, the extent of their rights, and
asset configurations. Careful analysis of the interaction among these
dimensions is the key to understanding the deep structure of property
law. Since each of the dimensions often pulls in a different direction,
property law developed various strategies to optimize among them.
Property law, as seen from a three-dimensional perspective, is a delicate balancing act that must often sacrifice one dimension for the sake
of another.
Understanding property in this way makes many ostensible doctrinal anomalies disappear. In addition to its explanatory power, our
three-dimensional approach offers a wide array of policy responses to
property challenges. It suggests that every property challenge may be
addressed on any one of the three dimensions or by any combination
thereof. Accordingly, policymakers always have more than one option
available to them. At the same time, they must be aware that intervention on one dimension will frequently lead to adjustments (or tensions) along the other two.
We also showed that that the three-dimensional view suggests a
more nuanced evolutionary account of property rights. The inherent
tension among the three dimensions causes property to be more shifty
and ever-changing than is currently assumed. Understanding property
law as a balancing act that spans three distinct, yet related, dimensions
leads to a richer and more coherent view of the field. We hope that
scholars and lawmakers will take advantage of this richness to tailor
better solutions to current and future property problems. The message
for policymakers is possibly even more valuable: every policy must be
analyzed along all three dimensions. Intervention that does not take
account of all three dimensions might often lead to unexpected adverse consequences and may even prove counterproductive.

